The Effects of Risk Management Programs on Financial Professionals\u27 Judgments by Boyle, James F
Kennesaw State University
DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University
Doctor of Business Administration Dissertations Coles College of Business
Fall 9-25-2015
The Effects of Risk Management Programs on
Financial Professionals' Judgments
James F. Boyle
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/dba_etd
Part of the Accounting Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Coles College of Business at DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Doctor of Business Administration Dissertations by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State
University. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@kennesaw.edu.
Recommended Citation
Boyle, James F., "The Effects of Risk Management Programs on Financial Professionals' Judgments" (2015). Doctor of Business
Administration Dissertations. Paper 14.
 
 
 
 
 
THE EFFECTS OF RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS ON FINANCIAL 
PROFESSIONALS’ JUDGMENTS 
 
by 
 
James F. Boyle 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation 
 
 
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the 
Degree of  
Doctorate of Business Administration  
In the 
Coles College of Business 
Kennesaw State University 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kennesaw, GA 
2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright by 
James F. Boyle 
2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
DEDICATION 
 
 I dedicate this paper to my mother Ann Marie Boyle, who passed away on 
February 22, 2015. Her undying and unconditional love has been a constant inspiration to 
me and her encouragement throughout my life has given me confidence to believe that I 
can achieve whatever I set out to do. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
ACKOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 I would like to thank my children Jimmy, Nicholas, Mary, and David for their 
love, encouragement, and patience as I pursued my doctorate degree. “You’re going 
again?” was a common question at my house each month as I packed my suitcase to 
travel to Atlanta from Scranton. I am also grateful to my father for the love and care that 
he gave to my children while I was away. 
 I would also like to thank my brother Douglas for generously providing me with 
expert guidance and continued support from the time I applied to Kennesaw State 
University through completion of this work. His graduation from the Kennesaw State 
University DBA program as a member of Cohort 1 and his successful transition into 
academia offered a clear model for me to follow. 
 I already heard remarkable things about my dissertation chair Dr. Dana 
Hermanson before I entered into the KSU doctorate program. These early positive 
perceptions about Dana were confirmed and exceeded by my personal experience 
working with him. His brilliance as a researcher is documented by his vast record of 
academic and practitioner journal publications, but his equally impressive teaching and 
mentoring skills must be experienced to be fully appreciated. 
 I also have been fortunate to have had Dr. Todd DeZoort on my dissertation 
committee and Dr. Jennifer Schafer as my reader. I have learned and developed from the 
steady guidance and insightful feedback from Todd and Jennifer and I am very 
appreciative to them both.
vi 
 
 I am also grateful to Dr. Neal Mero and Dr. Torsten Pieper for their competent 
and committed leadership of the DBA program. I thank Dr. Joseph Hair for sharing his 
expert knowledge and for challenging me to learn statistical methods that will benefit me 
in my future as a researcher. I am grateful to Dr. Divesh Sharma for patiently explaining 
accounting research and for sharing his incredible knowledge. I am also very appreciative 
of the many other highly-qualified and committed faculty and visiting scholars that I have 
been privileged to know and to learn from as a Kennesaw State University DBA student. 
 Finally, I would like to thank all of my fellow DBA students in Cohort 4 for their 
friendship and encouragement, and for listening to me talk about the dinner special at 
Cracker Barrel. Thank you Bright, Caroline, and Scott for your great teamwork in 
working through the accounting course assignments. Thank you Carole for helping me to 
learn SPSS and SEM software (and for moving the truck in AMOS!). Thank you John for 
your friendship and for letting me ride with you to the airport. Thank you Scott Ambrose 
and Alex for your friendship and for occasionally sharing a much-needed drink. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vii 
 
ABSTRACT 
THE EFFECTS OF RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS  
ON FINANCIAL PROFESSIONALS’ JUDGMENTS 
By 
James F. Boyle 
 
 Despite the present focus in practice on enterprise risk management (ERM), 
academic studies have not responded to the question, “How do risk management 
programs (RMPs) influence the business decisions of financial professionals?” This study 
addresses this issue by examining the effects of RMPs on the levels of judgment 
conservatism and effort exercised by financial professionals. Specifically, in a 2 x 2 
between-subjects experiment using experienced financial professionals as participants, I 
manipulated RMP type (i.e., robust or ceremonial) and financial risk level (i.e., high or 
low). The study examines the effect of RMP type and the interaction of RMP type and 
financial risk level on the degree of conservatism and effort of financial professionals’ 
business decisions.  
A robust RMP receives strong support from senior management and board 
members, who then hold financial professionals accountable for the level of financial risk 
that they assume in making business decisions. A ceremonial RMP lacks any real or 
substantive management or board support, but exists primarily to provide an appearance 
of a functioning and regulatory compliant RMP. Risk management interview studies 
(Viscelli, 2013; Cohen et al., 2015) support the relevance of robust (agency theory) 
versus ceremonial (institutional theory) perspectives from risk management practitioners.
viii 
 
Contrary to prediction, no significant relationship was found between RMP type 
or the interaction of RMP type with the financial risk level and either the degree of 
financial professional judgment conservatism or effort. However, a significant 
relationship between the financial risk level alone and the degree of financial professional 
judgment effort was found. These findings remain unchanged after adding to the model 
various possible control variables reflecting participants’ demographics and experience. 
Thus, the results of this study provide no evidence that a robust versus a ceremonial RMP 
significantly impacts financial professionals’ decisions about whether to make project 
investments or the amount of time or the extent of consultation needed for them to 
decide. Additional analyses revealed significant relationships between RMP type or 
investment size and other dependent variables.  
These results offer important implications for practitioners and policymakers, as 
well as contribute to academic research about new applications of accountability and 
agency theories.
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1 
CHAPTER 1  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Enterprise risk management (ERM), which advocates an organization-wide risk 
management approach over the traditional methodology of addressing risks individually, 
has received considerable attention from U.S. corporate management and board members 
since the issuance in 2004 of Enterprise Risk Management – Integrated Framework by 
the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO, 
2004). ERM focus renewed after the financial crisis of 2007-08, which was followed by 
market and regulatory actions aimed at restoring the public trust in U.S. corporations to 
effectively manage organizational risks. In 2008, Standard & Poor’s began to include an 
assessment of ERM as part of its criteria for evaluating public companies’ credit ratings 
(Standard & Poor’s, 2008). In 2010, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) required all U.S. public companies to disclose their board of directors’ oversight 
role over risk management (SEC, 2010). In addition, recent internal auditor surveys (IIA, 
2010; PwC: 2011, 2013) have identified risk management as a new top focus of the 
internal audit function. In 2013, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) corporate 
governance standards were expanded to require audit committees of U.S. public 
companies to discuss the firm’s risk management process and major financial risk 
exposures (NYSE, 2013).  
Despite this widespread attention on ERM in practice, the research literature lacks 
studies that address the effects of risk management programs on business decisions of
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financial professionals. McShane et al. (2011: 642) highlighted that, “Driven by the 
intense flurry of government and stock exchange activities related to risk management 
within corporations, trade and business publications directed at top management are full 
of articles related to ERM, yet academic research in the area is still rare.” Because 
financial professionals are responsible for approving a firm’s significant investing and 
financing activities that are essential to support organizational growth initiatives, it is 
important to study ERM’s possible impact on financial professionals’ willingness to take 
reasonable risks in making business decisions. The results of empirical studies that 
examined the relationship between ERM and firm value have been mixed for financial 
services and insurance industry companies. For example, Hoyt and Liebenberg (2011) 
find a positive relationship and McShane et al. (2011) find no relationship between ERM 
and firm value for studies of U.S. insurers. McShane et al. (2011: 653) ask, “Why does a 
strong or excellent ERM rating not lead to higher firm value? Is it possible that a strong 
ERM culture constrains firm growth that gets reflected in its market value?” 
 COSO (2004) indicates that the purpose of ERM is to manage organizational risks 
to provide reasonable assurance of achieving firm objectives, which ultimately focus on 
creating value for shareholders. Therefore, ERM (as a proxy for a robust RMP) may be 
“good” (i.e., value creating) for an organization to the extent that any resulting 
conservative risk judgments are balanced with and remain within the limits of the 
organization’s healthy, entrepreneurial “risk appetite.” In other words, a willingness to 
take reasonable financial risks consistent with the achievement of entity objectives is 
“good.” However, ERM (as a proxy for a robust RMP) may be “bad” (i.e., value 
diminishing) to the extent that any resulting conservative risk decisions are not balanced 
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with but rather end up constraining the organization’s healthy, entrepreneurial “risk 
appetite.” In other words, an unwillingness to take reasonable financial risks consistent 
with the achievement of entity objectives is “bad.” The possibility of this latter case 
appears to have prompted the question about whether “a strong ERM culture constrains 
firm growth that gets reflected in its market value” (McShane et al., 2011).   
The present study addressed these questions by examining the effects of ERM on 
the levels of conservatism and effort exercised by financial professionals while making 
business decisions. Specifically, in a 2 x 2 experiment using experienced financial 
professionals as participants, I manipulated risk management program (RMP) type (i.e., 
robust, agency theory approach to risk management, or ceremonial, institutional theory 
approach to create legitimacy) and financial risk level (i.e., high or low, as reflected by a 
relatively large or relatively small financial investment) randomly between-subjects. I 
then examined the effect of RMP type and the interaction of RMP type and financial risk 
level on the degree of financial professionals’ judgment conservatism and effort. In this 
study financial professionals made project investment decisions involving potential 
financial risks and rewards.   
 Prior ERM research has examined the extent of ERM implementation (Beasley et 
al., 2005), the ERM process (Viscelli, 2013), characteristics of firms that adopt ERM 
(Liebenberg and Hoyt, 2003; Pagach and Warr, 2011), factors associated with the impact 
of ERM on the internal audit function (Beasley et al., 2008), how governance parties (i.e., 
audit committee members, CFOs and external auditors) view their ERM roles in relation 
to the financial reporting process (Cohen et al., 2015), and ERM’s relation to firm value 
(e.g., Hoyt and Liebenberg, 2011; McShane et al., 2011; Baxter et al., 2013). In addition, 
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the relevance of a robust (agency theory) versus a ceremonial (institutional theory) RMP 
is supported by recent risk management interview studies (i.e., Viscelli, 2013; Cohen et 
al., 2015). However, these previous studies did not examine the effects of ERM on 
management business judgments and decision-making.  
 Prior financial professional decision-making experiments have focused on such 
considerations as gender differences in risk behavior (Powell, 1997), the effects of 
participants providing a counter explanation for resource allocation decisions on their 
escalation of commitment (Beeler, 1998), the influence of budget goal attainment on 
participants’ willingness to make riskier investment decisions (Ruchala, 1999), and the 
effects of moral reasoning on financial reporting decisions after Sarbanes-Oxley 
(Maroney & McDevitt, 2008). Past financial decision-making surveys have examined 
topics including the effects of subordinate participation in making budgetary decisions 
(Pasewark et al, 1990), the expanding role of the CFO to include value-added strategy 
contributions as well as traditional financial reporting (Sharma & Jones, 2010), and the 
importance of trust and risk factors related to budgetary roles of sponsorship management 
(Delaney & Guilding, 2011). Additionally, Lin and Sappington (2011) developed a model 
that shows the optimal policy to mitigate a manager’s planning moral hazard. However, 
these previous academic studies have not examined the effect of RMP type and financial 
risk level on financial professionals’ decision-making.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
Prior experiments with external (independent) auditors found that establishing or 
increasing the levels of accountability have consistently resulted in higher levels of 
judgment conservatism and effort (e.g., Asare et al., 2000; DeZoort et al., 2006; Lord, 
2002). Additional studies found that auditors’ judgments conform to the preferences of 
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the parties to whom the auditors are accountable (e.g., Abbott et al., 2010; Buchman et 
al., 1996; DeZoort & Lord, 1994). The interaction of multiple variables (e.g., auditors’ 
skills and task complexity) has been shown to strengthen the effects of accountability on 
auditors’ judgments (e.g., Tan et al., 2002). Finally, the influence of accountability on 
audit committee members’ judgments has also been examined (e.g., DeZoort et al., 2008; 
Persellin, 2013).  
 According to responsibility triangle theory (Schlenker et al., 1994: 632), 
“responsibility acts as a psychological adhesive that connects an actor to an event and to 
relevant prescriptions that should govern conduct.” Auditors (as actors) are responsible 
for their audit judgments (events) that are relevant to the auditing standards 
(prescriptions) to which the auditors are bound by their identity (position with the audit 
firm). Similarly, financial professionals (as actors) are responsible for their financial 
judgments (events) that are relevant to the risk management rules (prescriptions) to which 
the financial professionals are bound by their identity (organizational role). Furthermore, 
the accountability pyramid places governance players charged with the oversight of risk 
management (e.g., CEO, CFO, audit committee members) as an audience that holds 
actors accountable (i.e., answerable) for the riskiness of actors’ decisions and the related 
consequences (events). Actors often play the role of politicians (wanting to gain the 
approval and respect of important audiences) and cognitive misers (not wanting to 
perform unnecessary mental effort) by making judgments and decisions that are in 
accordance with the known preferences of audiences (an acceptability heuristic approach 
to coping with accountability pressures) (Schlenker et al., 1994; Tetlock, 1985).          
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Standard & Poor’s (2008) indicates that a firm-wide approach to risk provides 
assurance that the firm is paying attention to all of its risks. This task requires an 
organization-wide, integrated approach to the management of risks that has the support of 
board members and senior management. The necessity of ERM support from board 
members and senior management within the organization is clearly communicated in the 
COSO (2004) ERM definition, as well as in public company risk management standards 
(e.g., NYSE, 2013) and regulations (e.g., SEC, 2011; Dodd-Frank, 2010) that mandate 
board-level risk oversight. 
The purpose of the present study was to examine whether a robust RMP leads to 
financial professionals exhibiting higher levels of judgment conservatism and effort, and 
whether the RMP type interacts with the financial risk level to exacerbate this effect. 
Figure 1 that follows this introduction displays the experimental model. 
Despite regulatory mandates for public companies to pay attention to 
organizational risks and the considerable focus on RMPs in the marketplace and in 
practitioner journals, the results of this experimental study involving experienced 
financial professional participants found no evidence supporting any significant 
relationship between RMP type (i.e., as either robust or ceremonial) or the interaction of 
RMP type with the investment size and the likelihood that a participant would 
recommend or decide to make a financial project investment. Furthermore, no change in 
significance was noted after adding to the ANOVA model various possible control 
variables, including individual participants’ general risk-taking propensity variable based 
on the “Risk Taking Index” used by Nicholson, et al. (2005). However, a significant 
relationship was revealed between investment size and financial professional judgment 
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effort, as measured by how much time it would take and the extent others would be 
consulted for participants to develop a recommendation for the case project investment 
relative to a typical project investment recommendation. Interestingly, the study also 
indicated a significant relationship between investment size and the extent participants 
felt accountable to the board of directors for the risk associated with the project 
investment recommendation. Additionally, significant relationships were found between 
the RMP type and both the extent participants felt accountable to top management for the 
risk of their project investment recommendation and the extent participants believed top 
management was risk averse. However, these feelings of accountability to the board of 
directors and to top management, and the beliefs of top management risk aversion, did 
not appear to impact financial professional judgment conservatism (i.e., likelihood that a 
participant recommended to make the case financial project investment).         
The remainder of this paper is organized into four sections. The next section 
provides a literature review and develops the study’s hypotheses, which are based 
primarily on accountability, agency, and institutional theories. That section is followed by 
an explanation of the methodology and then a presentation of the data analysis and 
findings. The final section contains the study’s conclusions, limitations, implications, and 
opportunities for future research.   
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Figure 1: Risk Management Program Type/Financial Professional Judgment 
Experimental Model 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Background 
ERM use is widespread in practice. Public company risk management standards 
(e.g., COSO, 2004; NYSE, 2013) and regulations (e.g., SEC, 2010; Dodd-Frank, 2010) 
charge top management and board members of public companies with risk management 
oversight responsibilities. It is expected that this recent risk management focus will affect 
management decisions across organizations if the risk management focus is substantive. 
Specifically, financial professionals may feel pressured to more carefully consider risks 
associated with their business decisions when they are accountable to top management 
and the board who likely convey a greater preference for risk aversion if the risk 
management focus is substantive. The current literature has not looked at these aspects of 
risk management.   
The most widely accepted ERM definition in practice today was provided by the 
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) in its 
2004 Enterprise Risk Management – Integrated Framework, as follows. 
ERM is a process, effected by an entity’s board of directors, management, and 
other personnel, applied in a strategy setting and across the enterprise, designed to 
identify potential events that may affect the entity, and manage risk to be within 
its risk appetite, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of 
entity objectives. 
 
This COSO (2004) definition identifies key characteristics of the ERM process. 
The ERM framework is an integrated approach to managing organizational risks with 
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board level risk oversight. The ERM process occurs within a strategic setting and 
considers the entity’s particular risk appetite. Finally, the ERM process relates risks to 
providing reasonable assurance of achieving organizational objectives. COSO (2004) 
goes on to identify four categories of entity objectives: strategic, operational, reporting, 
and compliance. Specific entity risks may also be grouped within these categories. Recent 
studies indicate that CFOs also view their role as value creators involved in the entity’s 
strategic activities (Sharma & Jones, 2010). The present study asks financial professional 
participants to address financial risks associated with strategic objectives by making 
judgments related to project investment decisions involving varying degrees of financial 
risk and reward. Professional financial journals and prior financial professional academic 
studies indicate that such project investment decisions (a.k.a. capital budgeting) are 
common in practice for financial professionals (e.g., Farragher et al., 2001; Moreno et al., 
2002; Pike, 1988). Additionally, one of the two parts of the Certified Management 
Accountant (CMA) exam, which is administered by the Institute of Management 
Accountants (IMA), is entirely devoted to financial decision-making, including such 
risk/reward investment decisions.     
Prior Literature 
 While practitioner journals are full of ERM articles targeting management and 
board members to build ERM awareness and share best practices, academic studies 
addressing ERM are limited, and none appear to consider ERM’s effects on financial 
professional judgments. Prior financial professional decision-making studies likewise do 
not examine the influence of ERM on judgment. Experimental studies using auditors and 
audit committee members as participants reveal the effects of varying levels of 
11 
 
accountability on participants’ judgments. Another experiment examined the effect of 
inherent risk taking propensity and accountability on the riskiness of participants’ 
decisions. A selection of studies on ERM, financial professional decision-making, 
accountability effects on audit-related judgments, and individual inherent risk-taking 
propensity are presented and summarized in the following sections.   
Enterprise Risk Management       
ERM and company characteristics. Some researchers have examined 
characteristics of firms adopting ERM. Beasley et al. (2005) surveyed chief audit 
executives and found that the extent of ERM implementation to be positively related to 
the presence of a chief risk officer (CRO). The authors also found that board 
independence, ERM support from the CEO and CFO, the presence of a Big 4 auditor, 
firm size, and organizations in the banking, insurance, and education industries also 
signaled a more mature ERM process.  
Liebenberg and Hoyt (2003) studied a sample of firms that have appointed a chief 
risk officer (CRO) as a proxy for ERM adoption and found that firms that appointed a 
CRO had greater financial leverage than matched firms that did not appoint a CRO. This 
suggests that firms with higher relative debt levels are more likely to appoint a CRO to 
mitigate the increased financial risk exposure (e.g., inability to repay outstanding debt).  
Finally, Pagach and Warr (2011) also examine a sample of firms that hired a CRO 
as a proxy for ERM adoption. The authors found that ERM adoption is more likely for 
firms that are larger, more volatile, and have greater institutional ownership. 
Interestingly, the authors also found that ERM adoption (i.e., CRO appointment) is more 
12 
 
likely in firms that grant higher CEO risk-taking incentives. In this case it appears that 
boards implement ERM to help offset the CEO’s risk-taking compensation incentives.  
ERM and internal audit. The Institute of Internal Auditors’ (IIA’s) 2010 Global 
Internal Audit Survey of over 13,500 internal auditors, chief audit executives, and 
managers from 107 countries identified risk management as a top area of internal audit 
focus over the next five years, with 79% of respondents reporting an expected increase in 
internal audit activity of risk management. PricewaterhouseCoopers’ (PwC’s) 2011 State 
of the Internal Audit Profession Study, involving interviews with chief audit executives 
(CAEs), likewise revealed a planned increase of internal audit focus on ERM programs 
over the next three years reported by 79% of CAE’s interviewed. The PwC 2013 survey 
also identified coordination with ERM and other risk functions, as well as coverage of 
emerging risks, as characteristics of high-performing internal audit functions. 
Furthermore, the IIA provides an illustration (the ERM “fan”) that shows 
appropriate ERM roles that internal auditors should and should not undertake (IIA: 2004, 
2011). Essentially, the IIA prescribes that internal auditors should pursue ERM assurance 
activities, but avoid ERM management activities so that auditor independence and 
objectivity can be maintained.  
Beasley et al. (2008) conducted a survey of CAEs from 122 organizations 
worldwide (79 in the U.S.) to explore the impact of ERM on the internal audit function. 
They found that ERM has the greatest effect on internal audit activities when the ERM 
process was more complete, the CFO and audit committee called for ERM focus by 
internal audit, CAE tenure is longer, ERM leadership is provided by internal audit, and 
the entity is in the banking or education industry.  
13 
 
ERM process and roles. Viscelli (2013) conducted a qualitative study on the ERM 
process by interviewing ERM champions from 14 organizations and found that ERM 
implementation was associated with meeting strategic needs and encouragement by the 
board of directors and audit committee. Key players in the ERM process were internal 
audit (IA), general counsel, the audit committee, the CFO, and the board of directors. 
Despite the IIA’s ERM “fan” cautioning IA to avoid undertaking an ERM management 
role, the study found that IA usually assumed ownership over ERM leadership.  
Cohen et al. (2015) also conducted a qualitative study on ERM involving semi-
structured interviews of 32 experienced audit partners, CFOs, and audit committee (AC) 
members from 11 public companies. This study focused on how the participants view 
ERM and their ERM roles as specifically related to the financial reporting process. The 
authors found that all respondents defined ERM by emphasizing risk assessment and 
operational effectiveness/efficiency. However, only CFOs and AC members considered 
ERM strategic elements, whereas auditors’ narrower ERM definition neglected to 
mention ERM strategic components. Additionally, CFOs and AC members adopted a 
resource dependency view of ERM as it relates to financial reporting, with a balanced 
view of risk assessment and strategic objectives. In contrast, auditors embraced an agency 
perspective of ERM that fails to recognize the risk/reward trade-off of considering both 
the risks and potential payoffs associated with pursuing strategic objectives. 
Interview studies on robust versus ceremonial risk management processes. 
Viscelli (2013) conducted semi-structured interviews with ERM champions (key 
individuals involved with an ERM implementation) from 14 organizations to examine 
how institutional theory may be at work in the ERM process. This study considered 
14 
 
coercive, mimetic, and normative “isomorphism” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) as possible 
ways firms may adapt to (especially new and uncertain) rules and belief systems of their 
environment, such as those created by the recent ERM focus. Institutional theory suggests 
that the ERM process will be driven and manifested by firms becoming more alike in (1) 
responding to regulatory requirements and pressures (coercive isomorphism), (2) 
adopting ERM “best practices” from other successful organizations (mimetic 
isomorphism), and (3) pursuing ERM training and using risk consultants in order to be 
viewed as legitimate (normative isomorphism). Viscelli (2013) found evidence of 
institutional theory in the ERM process, especially by firms adopting ERM “best 
practices” (e.g., COSO framework) and using risk consultants (e.g., Big 4 firms). In 
addition, while 57% of ERM champions exhibited an agency theory ERM perspective by 
identifying “strategic need to better identify risk” as a reason why organizations 
undertake an ERM process, 29% of ERM champions reflected an institutional theory 
ERM view by mentioning “regulatory requirements” (coercive isomorphism) as a factor 
for implementing an ERM process.  
In further support of the role of institutional theory in the ERM process, another 
survey conducted by Beasley et al. (2011) of 455 executives (mostly CFOs) from a 
variety of industries and sizes revealed that 37.5% of all respondents and 52.9% public 
company respondents noted “regulatory demands” as a factor “mostly” or “extensively” 
leading to increased executive focus on risk management activities.  
Finally, while focusing primarily on the roles of agency theory and resource 
dependence theory in examining ERM and the financial reporting process, Cohen et al. 
(2015) acknowledge that institutional theory may also be relevant when ERM is viewed
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as symbolic in nature and governance players are ineffectual when monitoring risks in 
“form” (i.e., ceremoniously following a “checklist” approach) rather than in “substance” 
(i.e., robustly questioning risk practices).            
ERM and firm value. Hoyt and Liebenberg (2011) conducted a study of 117 
publicly traded U.S. insurers and found that ERM adoption, as evidenced by the existence 
of a CRO, was positively related to firm value, as measured by Tobin’s Q. In contrast, 
McShane et al. (2011) examined a sample of 82 publicly traded U.S. insurers and found 
no increase in value (as measured by Tobin’s Q) for firms achieving higher ERM ratings 
using Standard and Poor’s risk management rating as an independent measure of ERM 
quality. Baxter et al. (2013) also used the Standard and Poor’s risk management rating as 
a proxy for ERM quality for a sample of financial services companies and found no 
relation between ERM quality and market performance prior to (period January to 
August 2008) or during (period September 2008 to February 2009) the financial crisis of 
2008. However, ERM quality was positively associated with higher returns after the 
financial crisis. Greater firm complexity, less resource restraint, and better corporate 
governance were all controlled in the study, as they were also found to be positively 
associated with ERM quality.  
 Based on the ERM research discussed in the preceding sections, studies to date 
have reviewed characteristics of firms adopting ERM, the impact of ERM on the internal 
audit function, the ERM process and ERM roles, and the relationship between ERM and 
firm value. The present study makes a new contribution to existing ERM studies by 
examining the effects of ERM on managers’ decision-making in general and on financial 
professionals’ decision-making in particular. 
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Financial Professional Decision-Making  
A sample of important financial professional decision-making studies is discussed 
below to provide a contextual framework and to identify appropriate control variables for 
the present study. 
Financial professional experiments. Powell (1997) conducted an experiment with 
undergraduate and graduate business students as participants who made financial 
decisions related to insurance coverage and the currency market and found that females 
exhibited less risk-seeking behavior than males, after controlling for task familiarity and 
framing. Beller (1998) performed an experiment in which 288 accounting and finance 
professionals made resource allocation decisions before and after receiving feedback on 
the success of their earlier decisions. However, certain participants were required to 
provide explanations about why certain unexpected outcomes might occur before 
receiving feedback. This counter-explanation intervention strategy was found to increase 
reasoning and decrease escalation of commitment tendencies. Ruchala (1999) 
administered an experiment involving 60 students to make project investment decisions 
and found that participants make riskier investment decisions when they are not 
achieving budget goals, and this effect was exacerbated by the presence of bonus-based 
compensation. These results are consistent with prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979) which suggests that professionals will be risk seeking when in a loss position 
(analogous to not achieving budget goals) and risk averse when in a gain position 
(analogous to achieving budget goals). Maroney and McDevitt (2008) conducted an 
experiment using 72 MBA students to examine whether the Section 302 certification 
requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (requiring officers to certify that the 
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organization’s financial statements are fairly presented) affect financial reporting 
decisions. The study found an interaction between the participants’ moral reasoning level 
and the influence of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, such that the influence of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act was significantly positively associated with the reported loss for participants 
with lower moral reasoning, but not for participants with higher moral reasoning.  
Financial decision effectiveness under accountability. The present study examines 
the judgments of financial professionals who may be paying so much attention to risks in 
accordance with the risk management expectations of top management and board 
members that the financial professionals end up taking longer to make excessively 
conservative business decisions. Adelberg and Batson (1978) conducted an experiment 
with university students who allocated financial resources among financial aid applicants 
when the client’s financial needs exceeded available resources. The authors found that 
participants who were accountable to resource providers and recipients made less 
effective resource allocation decisions than non-accountable participants, who made more 
effective, tough resource allocation decisions. Thus, participants who were accountable to 
multiple parties made less effective financial resource decisions because they did not 
want to disappoint the parties (audiences) to whom the participants were accountable. 
Financial professional surveys and models. Pasewark and Welker (1990) asked 
financial executives to recall both a successful and an unsuccessful budget decision, 
along with the degree of subordinate participation in each decision. The results supported 
the recommendation of the Vroom-Yetton model to use high levels of participation in 
budgetary decision-making to enhance the likelihood of success. Sharma and Jones 
(2010) surveyed 241 CFOs and found that the role of today’s CFO is expanding from the 
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traditional financial reporting to include value creation strategy contributions. Delaney 
and Guilding (2011) conducted a survey of Australian organizations and found that trust 
and risk are significant factors affecting the importance of budgetary roles in the 
sponsorship investment decision-making setting. Lin and Sappington (2011) address the 
planning moral hazard faced by a CEO (the “principal”) who motivates a manager (an 
“agent”) to assess and make project investments to maximize performance. A planning 
moral hazard may result in the case of a manager who does not exercise due diligence in 
evaluating a project that the manager already considers to be either profitable or 
unprofitable. The study recommends a compensation structure to mitigate the planning 
moral problem that will induce the manager to under-invest in projects thought to be 
profitable and over-invest in projects initially considered to be unprofitable in order to 
encourage a thoughtful evaluation of each project unbiased by initial perceptions about 
profitability.  
 Overall, the studies on financial professional decision-making have considered 
whether certain factors (e.g., gender, loss or gain situation) affect risk taking propensity, 
the influence of accountability on financial decision effectiveness, and strategies to 
improve project investment choices. However, the impact of an organization’s RMP type 
and financial risk level on financial professionals’ judgments, the topic of the present 
study, has not yet been explored.  
Accountability Effects on Audit-Related Judgments 
Auditor studies. Although research on the effects of accountability on financial 
professionals’ decisions is limited, there is a large body of research examining 
accountability effects on auditors’ and audit committee members’ judgments. These 
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studies inform my research on accountability and financial professionals’ judgments. 
 Asare et al. (2000) conducted a 2 x 2 between-subjects experiment involving 91 
auditors making judgments about audit testing strategies to uncover an unexplained 
increase in a client’s gross profit margin. Accountable auditors (i.e., subject to superior 
review) exhibited higher judgment conservatism, as evidenced by a focus on the breath of 
testing (examining different potential hypotheses to explain the fluctuation), which is 
more defensible than a depth strategy (extensive testing a few hypotheses) when the 
preferences of supervisors are unknown. Additionally, the accountability condition led to 
an increase in the extent of testing (level of effort). 
DeZoort et al. (2006) manipulated accountability at four levels (i.e., anonymity, 
review, justification, and feedback) for 160 auditors from four Big 4 firms and one 
national accounting firm in an experiment that required auditors to make materiality 
judgments. The authors found that an increase in the level of accountability was 
associated with an increase in judgment conservatism and effort, as well as a decrease in 
judgment variability. Similarly, Hoffman and Patton (1997) examined the effects of 
accountability to superiors on the fraud risk judgments of 44 Big 6 auditors and found 
that accountability was positively related to judgment conservatism. This study also 
found that accountability was not related to an exacerbation of the dilution effect related 
to an over-interpretation of irrelevant information. 
Kennedy (1993) administered an experiment to 58 executive MBA students and 
171 Big 6 auditors involving judgments about a client’s ability to continue as a going-
concern. This study examined whether accountability mitigates recency effects (i.e., the 
overweighting of evidence presented later in a sequence) and found that only the MBA 
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students’ judgments were significantly affected by such recency effects. Furthermore, 
MBA students held accountable (through justification) were able to overcome recency 
effects through increased effort.  
Moreover, Koonce et al. (1995) conducted a study of 202 advanced-in-charge 
auditors and found that accountable auditors (i.e., auditors anticipating subsequent audit 
review of their judgments) provided more justifications (i.e., higher levels of effort) than 
non-accountable auditors for revisions to the audit plan in response to management’s 
explanation of unexpected account fluctuations and ratios that normally would require 
additional audit work. Johnson and Kaplan (1991) performed an experiment with 101 
auditor participants that involved inventory obsolescence judgments and discovered that 
accountable auditors displayed higher consensus (lower judgment variability) and higher 
self-insight (level of effort) than non-accountable auditors. Lord (1992) conducted a 
between-subject experiment with 30 experienced audit managers and found that auditors 
subject to accountability were less likely to issue an unqualified audit opinion than 
auditors who decisions were not subject to review. This finding supports a positive 
relationship between accountability and auditor judgment conservatism. 
 The results of additional auditor studies (Abbott, et al. 2010; Buchman et al., 
1996; DeZoort & Lord, 1994) are consistent with the acceptability heuristic (Tetlock: 
1992, 1985; Mero et al., 2007) strategy of coping with accountability by making 
judgments that are acceptable to those parties to whom the auditors are accountable.  
Abbott et al. (2010) surveyed 134 chief internal auditors and found a positive association 
between the level of audit committee (AC) oversight (measured by reporting lines, 
termination rights, and budgetary control) and the amount of internal audit function (IAF) 
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budget allocated to internal control activities. Conflicts may exist between management’s 
expectations of IAF activities (e.g., emphasis on operational goals and cost savings) and 
the AC’s expectations of IAF activities (e.g., internal controls focus). The study results 
suggest that the IAF will seek to satisfy the expectations of the party providing oversight 
over the IAF.  
Buchman et al. (1996) conducted an experiment to test the effect on auditors’ 
decisions of holding the auditors accountable to others with known views. Ninety-two 
Big 8 auditors were randomly assigned to three manipulation groups with different levels 
of accountability: accountable to no one, accountable to the client, or accountable to an 
audit partner.  Experienced auditor participants held accountable to an audit partner for 
their judgments (1) chose qualified opinions that conformed to the conservative views of 
audit partners and (2) exerted more effort by listing more items to justify their choices. 
The authors speculate that the same accountability effects were not observed for 
inexperienced auditors because experienced auditors were more aware of the implications 
and issues.  
DeZoort and Lord (1994) performed an experiment in which 146 auditors from an 
international accounting firm were randomly assigned to one of three obedience pressure 
groups: no pressure (control group), audit manager pressure, and audit partner pressure. 
The auditors made ethical judgments about whether to obey inappropriate instructions 
from superiors. The results indicated that auditors subject to higher obedience pressure 
(Milgram, 1974) were significantly more likely to follow inappropriate instructions from 
either an audit manager or audit partner (and thereby violate normal professional 
standards) than auditors not subject to such pressure. Furthermore, auditors’ judgments 
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were not significantly affected by their individual attitudes toward authority, as measured 
by a General Attitudes Toward Institutional Authority Scale (Rigby, 1982). 
 In addition, Tan et al. (2002) observed the interaction effects of skills and 
complexity in an experiment of 82 auditors from two Big 6 firms who were administered 
audit tasks of varying complexity and randomly assigned to a condition of either high 
accountability (i.e., required to provide their names and were informed their answers 
would be reviewed by a superior with unknown preferences) or low accountability (i.e., 
participants’ names and answers would remain anonymous). High (low) auditors’ level of 
knowledge was determined by whether they possessed above (below) the median 
knowledge scores on designated audit tasks. Auditor performance declined for increasing 
task complexity only under conditions of either low knowledge/high accountability or 
high knowledge/low accountability. Performance was unaffected for increasing task 
complexity under conditions of either high knowledge/high accountability or low 
knowledge/low accountability.  
Audit committee studies. Moving to the study of audit committee member 
judgments, DeZoort et al. (2008) performed an experiment examining responses before 
and after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) from 372 public audit 
committee (AC) members (131 pre-SOX from DeZoort et al. [2003] and 241 post SOX). 
The study found that AC members’ (especially AC members who were CPAs) support 
for an auditor proposed adjustment is significantly higher in the post-SOX period than in 
the pre-SOX period. Additionally, study participants supporting the auditor-proposed 
adjustment believed more strongly that AC members in the post-SOX period are more 
conservative and have more power than they did pre-SOX. This study shows how the 
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passage of a regulation (i.e., SOX) may create a high accountability condition that results 
in more conservative judgments (i.e., judgments that conform to the objectives of the 
regulation).  
Persellin (2013) conducted a similar experiment with 92 Executive MBAs 
participants serving as proxies for AC members. This study required participants to make 
judgments on their support for an income-reducing audit adjustment when AC members 
are compensated either primarily with short-term options or in cash. The study also 
examined the effect of an additional manipulated condition of either a high or low 
likelihood of Public Company Oversight Board (PCAOB) audit engagement inspection. 
The study results confirmed the main effect of a positive association between option 
compensation and less support for the income-reducing proposed audit adjustment. The 
results also found a significant interaction between the likelihood of PCAOB inspection 
and option compensation such that option compensation only affected the support for the 
income-reducing proposed audit adjustment when the likelihood of PCAOB inspection 
was low. 
Overall, the studies of accountability in the auditing realm suggest that 
accountability pressure leads to increased effort and more conservative judgments. 
Further, the recent increase in risk management accountability pressure should lead to 
financial professionals exerting more effort to make more conservative financial business 
decisions.  
Individual Participant General Risk-Taking Propensity 
 Weigold and Schlenker (1991) conducted an experiment with psychology 
students who were identified as either self-described high or low risk-takers (based on a 
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pretest questionnaire). The participants were given the choice between pairs of lotteries 
with the same expected value but varying levels of risk/reward (i.e., a higher risk lottery 
has a lower probability of a higher payout, whereas a lower risk lottery has a higher 
probability of a lower payout). Additionally, participants either were required 
(accountable) or not required (unaccountable) to explain and justify their decisions to 
others. When accountable, low risk-takers became significantly risk averse, but high risk- 
takers actually made slightly riskier decisions. A second study revealed that accountable 
low risk-takers found security in extreme risk aversion, whereas accountable high risk- 
takers admired and believed others admired high over low risk taking decisions.  
In the present study, the general risk-taking propensities of financial professional 
participants was measured (based on participants’ responses to risk-taking index 
questions from Nicholson et al., 2005) and examined to both control for individual 
participants’ general risk-taking propensities and determine if RMP type interacts with 
such risk-taking propensities to effect financial professionals’ judgments. 
Theory and Hypotheses Development 
Agency Theory versus Institutional Theory 
Agency theory is the predominant corporate governance perspective and heavily 
relied upon in accounting and finance literature (Cohen et al., 2008). Agency theory is 
derived from the fundamental agency problem of divergent interests between owners 
(principals) and managers (agents) associated with the corporate form of organization. 
This agency problem is caused by the separation of firm ownership (i.e., by shareholders) 
and control (i.e., by management) because “the decision process is in the hands of 
professional managers whose interests are not identical to those of residual claimants” 
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(Fama & Jensen, 1983: 331). Therefore, agency theory views the role of the board as an 
independent party that vigilantly monitors management to prevent opportunistic behavior 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
Institutional theory states that the creation of ceremonial structures for the benefit 
of constituencies, rather than the establishment of structures observable to external 
parties, are more related to the achievement of expected organizational outcomes 
(Kalbers & Fogarty, 1998). An implication of institutional theory in corporate 
governance is that the board may focus on ceremonial and symbolic roles in times of 
uncertain or ambiguous settings (Cohen et al., 2008), such as in an environment in which 
a firm seeks to manage an array of complex organizational risks. An example of a 
“ceremonial” practice of a public company board is to disclose the board’s risk 
management oversight role in compliance with SEC proxy requirements (SEC, 2010). 
Under institutional theory structural processes become more similar as organizations 
comply with governance regulations and follow “best practices” to create appearances of 
legitimacy and effective oversight (Beasley et al., 2009).  
In summary, agency theory emphasizes an independent, vigilant board monitoring 
of management, whereas institutional theory emphasizes ceremonial roles of governance 
where the appearance of legitimacy is more important than any real substantive oversight. 
In the present study, a robust RMP is supported by agency theory and characterized by 
diligent board risk oversight, the presence of an experienced, active chief risk officer 
(CRO), and the evaluation of risk management effectiveness by competent internal 
auditors. In contrast, a ceremonial RMP is supported by institutional theory and lacks any 
true board risk oversight, has appointed the controller who is inexperienced with risk 
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management as a symbolic action, and does not have an internal audit function that is 
focused on reviewing the risk management process.          
Accountability Theory 
Accountability can be defined as “the quality or state of being accountable; 
especially: an obligation or willingness to accept responsibility or to account for one’s 
actions” (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/accountability). In academic 
literature, “accountability refers to being answerable to audiences for performing up to 
certain prescribed standards, thereby fulfilling obligations, duties, expectations, and other 
charges” (Schlenker et al., 1994: p. 634). Accountable people can be made to explain and 
justify their decisions, and their conduct may be judged, scrutinized or sanctioned by 
audiences (Tetlock: 1985, 1992). People are motivated by several reasons to seek the 
approval and respect of audiences to whom they are accountable, such as symbolic 
psychological and tangible material benefits. The acceptability heuristic approach to 
coping with the pressures of accountability when the preferences of audiences are known 
is to simply make decisions that are in accordance with the preferences of audiences. This 
approach is consistent with the view of people as cognitive misers who seek to minimize 
the mental effort associated with considering alternative choices and instead just adopt 
the salient “acceptable” choice (Tetlock: 1985, 1992). In the present study, a fully 
functional ERM (where the board is charged with oversight of the organization’s risk 
management program) is a proxy for a robust RMP. Therefore, in a robust RMP the 
conservative preferences of top management and board members related to the 
management of risks are known by financial professionals.         
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The responsibility (a.k.a. accountability) triangle consists of prescriptions (rules 
for conduct), events (action taken by actors and related consequences), and identity 
(actor’s roles that connects him or her to the prescription and event) (Schlenker et al. 
1994). The evaluative reckoning of accountable people (actors) requires that the evaluator 
(audience) has information about prescriptions, events, and identity images and the 
connections among them. Accountability has a greater influence when either it relates to 
more important prescriptions (i.e., prescriptions that are highly regarded and have high 
potential personal consequences for the actor) or the relevant event has more important 
consequences (e.g., greater potential financial impact on the company) (Schlenker & 
Weigold, 1989). In the present study financial professionals are the actors, top 
management (including the Chief Risk Officer) and the board (especially the audit 
committee) are the audience, and ERM (i.e., how effectively risks are managed) is the 
prescription. Accordingly, a greater accountability impact is likely for a robust RMP that 
views the ERM prescription in high regard and the actors’ ERM event (actions) as having 
an important consequence than for a ceremonial RMP that considers the ERM 
prescription more as a symbolic rule to (ceremoniously) follow and actors’ ERM actions 
more as ritualistic events. 
Hypotheses 
 As discussed above, a robust RMP is supported by the agency theory view that 
members of senior management (e.g., CEO, CFO) and the board will genuinely support 
the RMP objectives, vigilantly monitor the risk assumed by managers, and hold financial 
professionals accountable for the riskiness of their financial decisions. In contrast, a 
ceremonial RMP is supported by the institutional theory perspective that senior 
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management and board members lack real support of the RMP objectives, employ 
symbolic structures (e.g., appointing a CRO) and take ritualistic actions (e.g., publicly 
disclosing the board’s risk oversight role) to advance the appearances of legitimate risk 
monitoring, and fail to require any substantive accountability for risks assumed by 
financial professionals in their business decisions.  
In accordance with the acceptability heuristic approach to coping with genuine 
accountability pressure applied by senior management and board members to pay 
attention to risk management within a robust RMP, financial professionals will seek to 
gain the approval and respect of the parties to whom they are accountable (i.e., senior 
management and the board) by making decisions that are in agreement with their known 
preferences. Therefore, financial professionals will likely make more conservative 
business decisions to reflect the conservative risk preferences of senior management and 
board members that provide oversight over a robust RMP. Participants were also asked 
about the factors that they considered in making case decisions to identify the reason(s) 
for their judgments. Additionally, numerous accountability studies discussed earlier find 
that greater accountability levels also result in more effort exerted by the accountable 
parties (actors) in order to fulfill the expectations of audiences that actors exercise due 
diligence. Therefore, a robust RMP is likely to also result in more effort exerted by 
financial professionals. Based on the above discussion, the first set of hypotheses follows:  
Hypothesis 1: Financial professionals of companies with a robust risk 
management program (RMP) will make more conservative financial investment 
business decisions than financial professionals of companies with a ceremonial 
RMP. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Financial professionals of companies with a robust risk 
management program (RMP) will exert more effort while making financial 
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investment business decisions than financial professionals of companies with a 
ceremonial RMP. 
 
As the combined importance of the triangle of responsibility elements become 
more potent (i.e., increase), so do the potential consequences for the actor (e.g., financial 
professional) at the time of evaluative reckoning (Schlenker et al., 1994). For example, in 
high financial risk environments financial decisions become more important and 
consequential than in low financial risk environments (to the extent that an individual 
perceives risk and responsibility for the specific judgment/decision). In other words, if 
risk is low (i.e., low probability of loss or small financial amounts are at risk), then the 
level of accountability is not expected to be as important. However, when risk is higher 
(i.e., higher probability of loss or larger financial amounts at risk), the stakes are raised, 
and the overseeing party’s view should become more important to the decision maker. 
Therefore, when financial risk level is high, the effect of a robust RMP on financial 
professionals is expected to be greater than when financial risk level is low. Additionally, 
Baxter et al. (2013) found that the market reacted positively to ERM quality only after the 
2008 financial crisis, but not before the market collapse. In other words, ERM only 
mattered to the market when the level of risk was high. Similarly, in the present study it 
is likely financial professionals’ levels of judgment conservatism and effort will conform 
more closely with the (risk averse) preferences of audiences within a robust RMP and 
when the level of financial risk is high than when the level of financial risk is low. In 
other words, it is expected that the robust RMP will matter more to financial 
professionals for high financial risk levels. Based on the above discussion, the second set 
of hypotheses (depicted in Figure 2) follows:  
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Hypothesis 3: The effect of robust RMP on financial investment judgment 
conservatism is greater when the level of financial risk is high than when the level 
of financial risk is low.  
 
Hypothesis 4: The effect of robust RMP on financial investment judgment effort is 
greater when the level of financial risk is high than when the level of financial 
risk is low. 
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Figure 2: Financial Professional Judgment Showing Predicted Interaction  
                               Between RMP Program Type and Financial Risk Level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The non-parallel lines indicate the anticipated ordinal interaction between risk 
management program type and financial risk level. The highest levels of financial 
professional judgment conservatism and effort are predicted to result for a robust RMP 
within a high financial risk level. 
HIGH High Risk 
Level 
Financial Professional 
Judgment 
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Low Risk 
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LOW 
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       Risk Management Program Type 
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CHAPTER 3  
METHODOLOGY 
Experimental Design and Case Development 
 I used an experimental design technique similar to the one used in DeZoort et al. 
(2006). The experimental materials consisted of an informed consent, followed by a brief 
case study that included sections for company and industry background, financial 
performance, capital budgeting policy: required rates of return on project investments, 
top management, board of directors and audit committee, external independent auditor, 
internal audit department, and four different versions – for each of the two risk 
management program types and each of the two financial risk levels (2 x 2 between-
subjects design). 
 The base case materials represented a publicly-traded household appliance 
manufacturing company (the Company) listed on the New York Stock Exchange and 
operating within a relatively robust industry, with the Company’s financial performance 
and position comparable to average companies in the industry. The Company’s 5-year 
historical net sales, net income, and total assets were derived from industry benchmark 
data, and its capital budgeting policy including the required rate of return on project 
investments is presented. Top management and the board of directors (including the audit 
committee) meet regularly and are qualified and experienced. The same external 
(independent) accounting firm has expressed a clean audit opinion on the Company for 
each of the past five years, and the Company has an active internal audit department.
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 A realistic and understandable case was developed by leveraging the experience 
of my professional accounting colleagues (many practicing CPAs with over five years of 
professional experience) and myself, as well as examining benchmark information and 
financial data of public companies in the household appliance industry and conducting a 
comprehensive literature review of enterprise risk management (ERM) academic studies 
(e.g., Baxter et al., 2013; Beasley et al., 2005; Cohen et al., 2015) and a study of current 
ERM regulations and guidelines (e.g., COSO, 2004, 2009; NYSE, 2013; Standard and 
Poor’s, 2008). In addition, my dissertation committee reviewed and provided feedback on 
the initial case that led to several rounds of constructive edits. Finally, four other 
academics with expertise in the area reviewed the case and provided substantive feedback 
leading to additional edits (particularly in the area of ERM public company proxy 
requirements and typical management and board ERM roles and responsibilities) that 
further enhanced the realism as well as the understandability of the final version of the 
case (see Appendix B for copy of case instrument).    
 Table 1 shows the 2 x 2 experimental design and expected cell sizes with two 
RMP types and two financial risk levels (total of four cells). Similar accounting studies 
have obtained approximately 15 responses per cell (e.g., DeZoort et al. 2003). 
Accordingly, the goal in this study was to secure approximately 15 completed 
instruments per cell, for a total of approximately 60 participants. 
Table 1: 2 x 2 Experimental Design and Expected Cell Sizes 
 
 High Financial Risk Low Financial Risk 
Robust 
Risk Management Program 
15-20 Participants 15-20 Participants 
Ceremonial 
Risk Management Program 
15-20 Participants 15-20 Participants 
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The online instrument was designed and administered in Qualtrics. Participants 
were experienced financial professionals and accessed the instrument through a link that 
was sent to them in three separate email requests by the Institute of Management 
Accountants (IMA) Director of Research (the IMA provided a research grant to support 
this study). These email requests were sent to IMA members that met the requisite 
experience and other selection criteria (the IMA has approximately 70,000 members). In 
addition, a fourth email request was sent to other suitable experienced accounting 
professionals (known through my professional network) in order to obtain the required 
minimum participants. Appendix A contains samples of the request emails. The 
instrument included a total of 49 items. However, each participant was presented with 
only a subset of items as determined by the experimental cells in which each participant 
was randomly assigned. 
 The instrument was submitted for review to the Institutional Review Boards at the 
University of Scranton and Kennesaw State University, who approved the final version of 
the instrument after suggested edits to the consent form were made. 
Experimental Task 
The instrument first presented an informed consent to each participant. Only 
participants who indicated their agreement and consent to participate in the study were 
able to proceed to access and complete the study. Upon providing consent, all 
participants were presented with the base case information. The participants were then 
randomly assigned to one of the two risk management program types (i.e., either robust 
or ceremonial) and given information describing the RMP type to which they were 
randomly assigned. Next participants were again randomly assigned to one of the two 
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financial risk levels (i.e., high or low) and provided information describing a possible 
new product introduction, along with the related financial risk level (high financial risk 
represented by a relatively large financial investment and low financial risk represented 
by a relatively small financial investment) to which they were randomly assigned.  
The participants were then asked to make two judgments - one related to 
judgment conservatism and one related to judgment effort, which are the two primary 
dependent variables of the study. Open-ended questions followed asking participants the 
factors that they considered in their judgment responses. Participants were then asked 
other questions that are examined as part of additional analysis. Then two manipulation 
check questions (one for the RMP type manipulation and one for the financial risk level 
manipulation) were presented, followed by questions about how realistic and 
understandable the case was, demographic and control data, participants’ general risk-
taking propensity, and the primary type of risk management programs that participants 
experienced in their careers. The instrument concluded with an invitation to participate in 
a gift certificate drawing and a question asking whether they would like to receive a 
summary report of the survey responses. Table 2 on the following page provides an 
outline of the Qualtrics instrument flow.
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Table 2: Instrument Flow 
 
 
Risk Level Risk Level Risk Level Risk Level 
Type 1: Type 2: Type 1: Type 2: 
High Low High Low 
Risk   Risk   Risk   Risk   
Survey Question - Realistic and Understandable 
Demographic and Control Data 
They Encounter in Practice 
Survey Question - Describe RMP Type  
Invitation to Drawing 
Ceremonial RMP 
Financial Manager Judgment Conservatism 
Financial Manager Judgment Effort 
Judgment Conservatism Factors Considered 
Judgment Effort Factors Considered 
Manipulation Checks 
Risk Management Program Type 
Manipulation 1: 
Robust RMP 
Risk Management Program Type 
Manipulation 2: 
Instructions and Informed Consent 
Base Case Information 
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In this study, participants were asked to assume that they were employed as 
financial managers charged with evaluating and making recommendations about whether 
the Company should pursue project investment opportunities. Furthermore, as financial 
managers of the Company, they should assume that they report to the Controller and that 
the success or failure of their investment recommendations is considered in their 
performance evaluation and in determining their base pay adjustments and any incentive 
pay (e.g., bonuses).  
The first primary judgment task related to the participants’ level of judgment 
conservatism in responding to the request to indicate the likelihood they would 
recommend that the Company make the financial investment to manufacture a new 
household appliance (i.e., a swift-cook oven). Such investment project decisions (a.k.a. 
capital budgeting) are common in practice for financial professionals (e.g., Farragher et 
al., 2001; Moreno et al., 2002; Pike, 1988) and prominently covered on the Certified 
Management Accountant (CMA) exam.  
The second primary judgment task related to the participants’ level of judgment 
effort in responding to two separate requests. The first request was to indicate how much 
time participants would take to develop a recommendation for this project investment 
relative to a typical project investment recommendation. The second request was to 
indicate the extent that they would consult with others to develop a recommendation for 
this project investment relative to a typical project investment recommendation. In 
addition, participants were asked to describe the factors they considered in making each 
judgment and to indicate the individual(s) with whom they would consult.  
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The participants were then asked additional questions each on a sliding scale from 
0 to 100 for the purpose of better understanding their levels of judgment conservatism 
and judgment effort in deciding whether to recommend that the Company make the case 
project investment and how much relative time and consultation they would need to make 
their recommendation. 
Independent Variables Case Manipulations 
In the case of a robust RMP the board of directors has directed management to 
establish an organization-wide risk management program primarily to ensure that the 
Company is effectively managing its risks. In contrast, in the case of a ceremonial RMP 
the board of directors has directed management to establish an organization-wide risk 
management program primarily to demonstrate that the Company is in compliance with 
regulations (e.g., SEC, 2010; NYSE, 2013). The high financial risk case requires a large 
financial investment (relative to other project investments), and the low financial risk 
case requires a small financial investment (relative to other project investments). 
Factors Affecting Participants’ Recommendations 
The first additional question asked participants the extent that certain factors (i.e., 
board of directors’ attitude toward risk management, top managements’ attitude toward 
risk management, the employee appointed in charge of risk oversight, internal audit’s 
level of evaluation of the Company’s ERM program, and the relative size of the project 
investment) affected their recommendation about whether the Company should make the 
project investment based on a sliding scale from 0 to 100 (0 represents minimal effect, 50 
represents moderate effect, and 100 represents significant effect).  
Extent Participants Felt Accountable to Board and Top Management  
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 The second additional question asked participants to what extent they felt 
accountable to (1) the board of directors and (2) top management for the risk associated 
with their recommendation about whether the Company should make the project 
investment based on a sliding scale from 0 to 100 (0 represents minimal accountability, 
50 represents moderate accountability, and 100 represents significant accountability). 
Extent Participants Believed the Board and Top Management are Risk Averse 
 The third additional question asked participants to indicate the extent that they 
believe (1) the board of directors and (2) top management are risk averse based on a 
sliding scale from 0 to 100 (0 represents minimal risk aversion, 50 represents moderate 
risk aversion, and 100 represents significant risk aversion). 
Perceived Level of Risk for this Project Investment 
 The fourth additional question asked participants to indicate the level of risk for 
this project investment based on a sliding scale from 0 to 100 (0 represents low risk, 50 
represents moderate risk, and 100 represents high risk). 
Extent Participants Believed the Board and Top Management Supported the Company’s 
ERM Program 
 
 The fifth additional question asked participants to indicate the extent they believe 
(1) the board of directors and (2) top management support the Company’s ERM program 
based on a sliding scale from 0 to 100 (0 represents minimal support, 50 represents 
moderate support, and 100 represents significant support). 
Manipulation Check Questions 
 The participants were then asked two manipulation check questions to determine 
whether they were able to identify the correct RMP type and the correct financial risk 
level in which they were randomly assigned. The RMP type manipulation check question 
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asked participants to indicate the Company’s primary motivation for establishing its 
ERM program based on the facts in the case. The correct response for the robust RMP 
was “to ensure that the Company is effectively managing its risks.” The correct response 
for the ceremonial RMP was “to demonstrate that the Company is in compliance with 
SEC and NYSE regulations.” The financial risk level manipulation check question asked 
participants to indicate the relative size of the project investment in this case. The correct 
response for the high financial risk level was “large” and the correct response for the low 
financial risk level was “small.” 
Realistic and Understandable Case 
 Next participants were asked to indicate how realistic this case was on a sliding 
scale from 0 to 100 (0 represents very unrealistic, 50 represents moderately realistic, 100 
very realistic) and how understandable this case was on a sliding scale from 0 to 100 (0 
represents very difficult to understand, 50 represents moderately understandable, and 100 
represents very understandable).  
Participants’ ERM and Project Investment Experience 
 Participants were then asked about their career experience working with ERM 
programs. Those participants answering “yes” to the question about whether they have 
had any experience with a risk management program in their career were then asked what 
the primary focus of the RMP(s) they experienced on the basis of a sliding scale from 0 
to 100 (0 represents primarily compliance-based ERM focus, or a ceremonial RMP, and 
100 represents primarily risk-based ERM focus, or a robust RMP).  
 Participants were also asked to indicate whether they have had any professional 
experience in making project investment recommendations or decisions in their career. 
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Those responding “yes” were then asked (using a sliding scale from 0 to 100) to indicate 
the extent of such experience (0 represents minimal experience, 50 represents moderate 
experience, and 100 represents significant experience) and the degree such experience 
has been favorable (0 represents very unfavorable and 100 represents very favorable). 
Individual Participants’ General Risk-Taking Propensities 
 Based on the Nicholson et al. (2005) Risk Taking Index, participants were then 
asked to indicate the frequency that six general risk-taking situations not related to the 
specific case study have ever applied to them now or in their adult past based on a 5-
point scale (1 = never, 2 = rarely, 3 = occasionally, 4 = often, and 5 = very often). 
Therefore, participants made a total of 12 responses to measure their general risk-taking 
propensities to be used as a possible control variable. 
Demographic Data and Invitation to Drawing 
 The experiment concluded with a series of questions related to participant 
demographic data, additional participant thoughts about the case, and whether 
participants would like to receive by email a summary report of survey responses, as well 
as an invitation to enter into a drawing for a gift certificate. 
Independent Variables 
 The study includes two categorical independent variables of interest: (1) RMP 
type (robust or ceremonial) and (2) financial risk level (high or low).  
RMP (robust). In the experiment the expressed purpose of a robust RMP is 
primarily to ensure that the Company is effectively managing its risks. As such, a robust 
RMP receives strong support from the board of directors and top management, who are 
willing to expend the required resources to ensure that it is properly implemented. A 
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robust RMP is also characterized by appointing someone to assume risk oversight 
responsibilities (e.g., a CRO) who has specialized risk management experience and 
regularly conducts specific risk management meetings and generates risk reports, as well 
as regular internal audit ERM evaluation.  
In practice a robust RMP is a fully functioning, integrated ERM program, as 
described in COSO (2004). Specifically, a robust RMP has the support of senior 
management (including the CEO, CFO) and the board (especially the audit committee), 
has regular and productive CRO-led executive and board risk management sessions, and 
is subject to regular evaluation of the effectiveness of organization-wide risk 
management by a competent internal audit function. These attributes of a robust RMP 
were derived from the literature. Specifically, senior management and board support, as 
well as the presence of a CRO, have been positively related to ERM implementation 
(Beasley et al., 2005). Additionally, the presence of a CRO has been used as a proxy for 
ERM adoption (Hoyt & Liebenberg, 2011; Pagach & Warr, 2011). Furthermore, a more 
complete ERM has been found to have the greatest impact in internal audit activities 
(Beasley et al., 2008). In addition, recent audit surveys (e.g., IIA, 2010; PwC, 2011) have 
identified risk management as a new focus of the internal audit function. 
RMP (ceremonial). In the experiment the expressed purpose of a ceremonial RMP 
is primarily to demonstrate that the Company is in compliance with regulations (e.g., 
NYSE, 2013; SEC, 2010; COSO, 2004). As such, a ceremonial RMP lacks any real 
support from the board of directors and top management, who are unwilling to expend 
resources to implement a RMP that effectively manages the Company’s risks. A 
ceremonial RMP is also characterized by appointing someone to assume risk oversight 
43 
 
 
responsibilities (e.g., the controller) who lacks specialized risk management experience 
and does not conduct specific risk management meetings or generate risk reports, as well 
as the lack of internal audit ERM evaluation.    
In practice a ceremonial RMP is primarily a symbolic, disjointed risk 
management program that is more of a ritualistic process to create the appearance of 
legitimacy rather than to effectively manage organizational risks. It has no or very limited 
senior management and board support. Additionally, it has no or sporadic and marginally 
effective risk sessions or reports, a CRO or other employee appointed in charge of risk 
management with no or limited ERM experience or access to senior management and the 
board, and no or very little IA focus on the effectiveness of the RMP. These 
characterizations of a ceremonial RMP are consistent with institutional theory (Kalbers & 
Fogarty, 1998).  
Financial risk level (high). In the experiment a high financial risk level is 
represented by a capital budgeting decision for a new product introduction that requires a 
large financial investment (relative to other project investments). Additionally, missing 
the Company’s minimum required return on relatively large investments significantly 
impacts the Company’s ability to meet its overall profitability goals. In the experiment 
the new product introduction (manufacturing of swift-cook ovens) would be funded 
through internal funds and not through the issuance of debt. Therefore, the financial risk 
level is not influenced by assuming more debt, but only through the relative required size 
of the financial investment. In this study, I intentionally manipulated only the size of the 
required financial investment for the financial risk level, because simultaneously 
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increasing the Company’s debt for the high financial risk condition may have resulted in 
extreme conservative judgments. 
Academic literature indicates that high financial risk is characterized by 
organizational risk decisions with significant financial impact (e.g., Schlenker & 
Weigold, 1989) and relatively higher financial leverage (e.g., Liebenberg & Hoyt, 2003) 
with associated debt covenant restrictions. First, risk decisions with significant financial 
impact represent accountability triangle events that have more important consequences 
for the decision maker (Schlenker & Weigold, 1989) and thus are properly associated 
with a high financial risk. Second, Liebenberg & Hoyt (2003) found that firms that 
appoint CROs (proxy for ERM) had greater financial leverage. In this case the CRO 
appointment was believed to offset the increased risk associated with a higher ratio of 
debt to equity (i.e., greater financial leverage). Higher levels of debt increase risk because 
debt must be repaid even if earnings or cash flows go down.        
Financial risk level (low). In the experiment a low financial risk level is 
represented by a capital budgeting decision for a new product introduction that requires a 
small financial investment (relative to other project investments). Additionally, missing 
the Company’s minimum required return on relatively large investments modestly 
impacts the Company’s ability to meet its overall profitability goals. In the experiment 
the new product introduction (manufacturing of swift-cook ovens) would be funded 
through internal funds and not through the issuance of debt. Therefore, the financial risk 
level is not influenced by assuming more debt, but only through the relative required size 
of the financial investment. In this study, I intentionally manipulated only the size of the 
required financial investment for the financial risk level, because simultaneously 
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increasing the Company’s debt for the high financial risk condition may have resulted in 
extreme conservative judgments. 
Academic literature indicates that low financial risk includes organizational risk 
decisions with less financial impact (e.g., Schlenker & Weigold, 1989) and lower 
financial leverage (e.g., Lienbenberg & Hoyt, 2003) with few debt covenant restrictions. 
These low risk traits represent the opposite of the high financial risk level traits (i.e., low 
versus high financial impact and lower versus higher financial leverage) discussed earlier 
under the high financial risk condition. 
In addition to the manipulated independent variables, I consider several possible 
control variables, including participants’ general risk-taking propensities, gender, years of 
professional experience, current title, professional certifications, education (highest 
degree), industry, company size, and early vs. later responders.  
Dependent Variables 
 The two primary continuous dependent variables in this study are (1) financial 
professional judgment conservatism and (2) financial professional judgment effort. 
Financial professional judgment conservatism is measured on a sliding scale from 0 to 
100 related to the likelihood that participants would recommend that the Company make 
a financial investment in a new product introduction with a potential financial upside 
(reward) and financial downside (risk). Financial professional judgment effort is 
measured on two sliding scales each from 0 to 100 related to relatively (1) how much 
time it would take and (2) the extent of consultation the participant would seek to make 
the project investment recommendation. Participants were then asked to describe the 
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factors they considered in their judgment responses, and to indicate the individual(s) they 
would consult. 
Primary Variable 1: Financial Manager Judgment Conservatism 
(CONSERVATISM) 
Participants were asked to evaluate a project investment opportunity and 
recommend whether the Company make a financial investment as follows: 
As a financial manager charged with evaluating and making 
recommendations about whether the Company should pursue 
project investment opportunities, please slide the bar below to 
indicate the likelihood you would recommend that the Company 
make the financial investment to manufacture the new swift-cook 
oven (0 = Not at all likely, 50 = Moderately likely, 100 = Very 
likely). 
 Primary Variable 2a: Financial Manager Judgment Effort (EFFORT) 
Participants were asked relatively how much time they would take to 
recommend whether the Company make a financial investment as follows: 
Please slide the bar below to indicate how much time you would 
take to develop a recommendation for this project investment 
relative to a typical project investment recommendation (0 = Much 
less time, 50 = About average time, 100 = Much more time). 
  Primary Variable 2b: Financial Manager Judgment Effort (EFFORT) 
Participants were asked the extent that they would consult with others to 
recommend whether the Company make a financial investment as follows: 
47 
 
 
Please slide the bar below to indicate the extent that you would 
consult with others to develop a recommendation for this project 
investment relative to a typical project investment recommendation 
(0 = Much less consultation, 50 = About average consultation, 100 
= Much more consultation).    
The use of a sliding scale from 0 to 100 to measure these primary judgments is common 
in the accounting literature for these types of studies (e.g., DeZoort et al. 2003, 2008). 
Control Variables 
  In this study, I consider several potential covariates as possible control variables 
including general risk-taking propensity (the Data Analysis and Results section includes 
more information on possible control variables). The general risk-taking propensity 
variable identified an overall risk-taking score for each participant based on their 
responses to 12 questions related to six general risk-taking situations that comprise “The 
Risk Taking Index” used by Nicholson et al. (2005). This Risk Taking Index is a scale 
used to assess an individual’s overall risk propensity related to reported frequency of risk 
behaviors in six domains. The results of structural equation modeling of the Risk Taking 
Index supports that the six factor model is superior to other models (i.e., single factor, 
two factor, and six-factor plus a second order overall factor), is more parsimonious with 
desirable goodness of fit, and has high internal consistency for the general propensity 
scale (Cronbach’s alpha 0.80) (Nicholson et al., 2005). The Risk Taking Index is a short, 
simple measure of risk-taking with high face validity that was developed by asking 
people about risk behaviors in several common life experiences in which many people 
would be exposed to risk. Evidence from risk literature indicates that some psychological 
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constructs can be effectively measured with short questionnaires (Robins et al., 2001). 
Nicholson et al. (2005) found that risk propensity is related to age, sex, measures of 
career risk-taking, and personality. The Risk Taking Index questions appear below 
(Nicholson et al., 2005: 174): 
Please could you tell us if any of the following have ever applied to you, now or 
in your adult past? Please use the scales as follows: 
 
1 = never, 2 = rarely, 3 = occasionally, 4 = often, 5 = very often 
 
            Now    In the Past 
Recreational risks (e.g., rock-climbing, scuba diving)  1 2 3 4 5            1 2 3 4 5 
 
Health risks (e.g., smoking, poor diet, high alcohol 
consumption)                                                                  1 2 3 4 5            1 2 3 4 5 
 
Career risks (e.g., quitting a job without another to 
go to)                                                                              1 2 3 4 5             1 2 3 4 5 
 
Financial risks (e.g., gambling, risky investments)        1 2 3 4 5             1 2 3 4 5  
 
Safety risks (e.g., fast driving, cycling without  
a helmet)                                                                         1 2 3 4 5             1 2 3 4 5 
 
Social risks (e.g., standing for election, publically 
challenging a rule or decision)                                       1 2 3 4 5             1 2 3 4 5 
 
Model 
 Based on the above discussion of the independent, dependent, and possible 
control variables, I use the following MANOVA model to test my hypotheses (followed 
by individual ANCOVAs for judgment conservatism and judgment effort separately): 
(CONSERVATISM, EFFORT) = F (RMP TYPE1, FINANCIAL RISK LEVEL2, 
RMP TYPE X FINANCIAL RISK LEVEL, Possible Control Variables3) 
     1 ROBUST RMP, CEREMONIAL RMP 
     2 HIGH FINANCIAL RISK LEVEL, LOW FINANCIAL RISK LEVEL 
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     3 I consider variables including GENDER, YEARS OF PROFESSIONAL     
       EXPERIENCE, RMP EXPERIENCE, PROJECT INVEST EXPERIENCE,  
       CURRENT TITLE, PROFESSIONAL CERTIFICATIONS, EDUCATION,   
       INDUSTRY SEGMENT, REVENUE OF EMPLOYER, EARLY OR LATE  
       RESPONDERS, GENERAL RISK-TAKING PROPENSITY.    
Participants 
 The study’s participants were a sample of experienced financial professionals. 
The study received a competitive research grant from the Institute of Management 
Accountants (IMA), which has over 70,000 worldwide members. Three email requests 
with a link to the experiment were sent by the IMA Research Director to approximately 
5,000 IMA members with at least 5 years of professional experience and employed in 
U.S. manufacturing companies. These criteria were necessary because my experimental 
case involved a manufacturing company, and the participants needed a high level of 
experience to make some complex case judgments. Sample copies of the email requests 
sent to IMA members appear in Appendix A. In addition, I sent an email request with a 
link to the experiment to a group of experienced accounting alumni from the University 
of Scranton to increase the response. Email requests with a link to the experiment were 
sent in November and December 2014. A total of 88 completed experiments were 
received: 71 completed experiments from the IMA members and 17 completed 
experiments from the University of Scranton accounting alumni. Excluding three 
responses that each indicated over 8 hours to complete (apparently these participants 
started the survey and completed it at a later time), the mean completion time for the 
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remaining 85 completed experiments was 26.5 minutes. Fully completed experiments for 
each of the four cells in the 2 x 2 experimental design are shown in Table 3.  
Table 3: Fully Completed Experiments (88 Total Participants) 
 
 High Financial Risk 
(Relatively Large  
Investment Size) 
Low Financial Risk 
(Relatively Small  
Investment Size) 
Robust Risk Management Program 
(Risk-Based) 
26 Participants 23 Participants 
Ceremonial Risk Management Program 
(Compliance-Based) 
18 Participants 21 Participants 
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CHAPTER 4  
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Manipulation Checks 
 All of the 88 participants were presented with two manipulation check questions 
to determine whether the participants could identify into which experimental conditions 
they were randomly assigned. The participants were asked to answer the manipulation 
check questions without referring back to prior screens in the online instrument.  
The first manipulation check question related to the RMP program type (robust or 
ceremonial) as follows: 
Please indicate the Company’s primary motivation for establishing its ERM 
program based on the facts of the case: 
 
o To ensure that the Company is effectively managing its risks 
o To demonstrate that the Company is in compliance with SEC and NYSE 
regulations 
 
The second manipulation check question related to the financial risk level (high or low), 
as reflected by the relative size of the project investment (large or small) as follows: 
 Please indicate the relative size of the project investment in this case: 
 
o Large 
o Small 
 
The order of the response choices was randomized for each participant.  
Out of 88 participants who completed experiments, 26 participants (or 29.5%) 
failed the RMP program type manipulation check, and 5 participants (or 5.7%) failed the 
financial risk level manipulation check. Overall, 60 participants (or 68.2%) passed both 
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manipulation checks. This manipulation check pass rate is consistent with some other 
accounting studies that targeted experienced professionals (e.g., DeZoort et al., 2003, 
2008). The reason for the higher manipulation check failure rate for the RMP program 
type (29.5%) than for the financial risk level (5.7%) may be attributable to the fact that in 
practice an actual RMP may exhibit some characteristics of both a robust RMP and a 
ceremonial RMP. Table 4 shows the random distribution among the four experimental 
cells of the 60 participants who fully completed the instrument and passed all 
manipulation checks. The number of responses for each cell is consistent with some 
previous accounting studies (e.g., DeZoort et al., 2003, 2008).   
Table 4: Fully Completed and Passed All Manipulation Checks (60 Total Participants) 
 
 High Financial Risk 
(Relatively Large  
Investment Size) 
Low Financial Risk 
(Relatively Small 
Investment Size) 
Robust Risk Management Program 
(Risk-Based) 
14 Participants 14 Participants 
Ceremonial Risk Management Program 
(Compliance-Based) 
17 Participants 15 Participants 
 
Sample Size and Missing Data  
As many as three of the 60 participants who completed and passed all 
manipulation checks failed to respond to questions measuring certain dependent 
variables. Therefore, the N for particular dependent variables ranges from 57 to 60 
(details provided in each table below).  
Realistic and Understandable Case 
Two questions were asked to measure the participants’ perceptions about the case 
realism and understandability. The first question asked participants to indicate how 
realistic this case was on a sliding scale from 0 to 100 (0 represents very unrealistic, 50 
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represents moderately realistic, and 100 represents very realistic). As shown in Table 5, 
the 60 participants perceived the case to be realistic (mean of REALISTIC = 67.65, SD of 
19.16; only two participants rated lower than 25 and seven rated lower than 50). The 
second question asked participants to indicate how understandable the case was on a 
sliding scale from 0 to 100 (0 represents very difficult to understand, 50 represents 
moderately understandable, and 100 represents very understandable). The 60 participants 
perceived the case to be understandable (mean of UNDERSTANDABLE = 76.07, SD 
15.10; no participants scored lower than 25 and only 3 participants scored lower than 50).  
Table 5: Realistic and Understandable Case 0-100 Scale Variables 
 
 
Description of Scaled Variables  
 
n 
 
Mean 
 
S.D. 
Indicate how realistic this case was: 
0 = Very unrealistic 
50 = Moderately realistic 
100 = Very realistic  
 
 
60 
 
 
67.65 
 
 
19.16 
Indicate how understandable this case was: 
0 = Very difficult to understand 
50 = Moderately understandable 
100 = Very understandable 
 
 
60 
 
 
76.07 
 
 
15.10 
 
Demographics 
 Demographic information for the 60 participants is presented in Table 6 below. 
More males (43 or 71.7%) participated in the experiment than females (17 or 28.3%). 
Participants had significant professional experience, with 55 participants (91.7%) having 
more than 15 years of professional business experience, and had specialized career 
experience relevant to the case, with 41 participants (68.3%) having experience with risk 
management programs and 47 participants (74.6%) having experience making project 
investment decisions. Current titles indicate that participants were mostly financial 
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managers (13 or 21.7%), controllers (10 or 16.7%), external auditors (6 or 10.0%), and 
CFOs (5 or 8.3%), with several business owners, presidents, and vice-presidents included 
in the “other” category. Participants worked mostly for public companies (21 or 35.0%), 
private for-profit companies (21 or 35.0%), and public accounting firms (11 or 18.3%), 
and they worked mainly for employers with large revenues (23 participants or 39.0% 
worked for employers with revenues of more than $1 billion, and 54 participants or 
90.0% worked for employers with revenues of $10 million or more). Fifty-one (or 85.0%) 
of participants had at least one professional accounting or finance certification (32 
participants or 53.3% were CMAs and 27 participants or 45.0% were CPAs), and the 
participants were well educated, with the participants’ highest degree being a Bachelor’s 
(29 or 48.3%), Master’s (29 or 48.3%), Law (1 or 1.7%), and Doctorate (1 or 1.7%).     
Table 6: Demographic Information 
 
Gender Male 43 71.7% 
Female 17 28.3% 
Total Years of Professional 
Business Experience  
 
 
 
 
Less than 5 years  3 5.0% 
5 to 10 years 3 5.0% 
11 to 15 years 2 3.3% 
16 to 20 years 13 21.7% 
21 to 25 years 13 21.7% 
Over 25 years 26 43.3% 
Experience with Risk 
Management Program in 
Career? 
Yes 41 68.3% 
No 19 31.7% 
Experience Making Project 
Investment Decisions in 
Career? 
Yes 47 74.6% 
No 11 17.5% 
Current Title Financial Manager 13 21.7% 
Controller 10 16.7% 
External Auditor 6 10.0% 
Chief Financial Officer 5 8.3% 
Assistant Controller 4 6.7% 
Staff Accountant 3 5.0% 
Other Professional 19 31.7% 
Business Segment Public Company 21 35.0% 
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Private For-Profit Company 21 35.0% 
Public Accounting 11 18.3% 
Not-For-Profit 3 5.0% 
Other 4 6.7% 
Annual Revenue of Your 
Employer 
 
 
 
Less than $10 million 6 10.2% 
$10 million to $100 million 13 22.0% 
$101 million to $500 million 13 22.0% 
$501 million to $1 billion 4 6.8% 
More than $1 billion 23 39.0% 
Professional Certifications 
 
 
 
 
CMA 32 53.3% 
CPA 27 45.0% 
CFA 2 3.3% 
Other 13 21.7% 
None 9 15.0% 
Highest Educational Degree 
 
 
 
Bachelor’s Degree 29 48.3% 
Master’s Degree 29 48.3% 
Law Degree 1 1.7% 
Doctoral Degree (e.g., Ph.D., 
DBA) 
1 1.7% 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Descriptive statistics and independent samples test are presented in Tables 7, 8, 9, 
10, and 11 below.  
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
Independent Variables: 
 
Dependent Variables: 
 
 DV#1: 
Recommend 
Invest 
DV#2a: 
Relative 
Time to 
Recommend 
DV#2b: 
Relative 
Extent of 
Consultation 
Robust RMP  
 (Risk-Based) 
N 28 27 25 
Mean 40.64 61.19 70.04 
S.D. 21.03 20.47 20.29 
Ceremonial RMP   
(Compliance-Based) 
N 32 32 32 
Mean 39.63 63.09 71.22 
S.D. 22.31 18.45 18.04 
High Financial Risk 
(Relatively Large 
Investment Size) 
N 31 31 30 
Mean 37.71 69.23 75.83 
S.D 22.13 19.74 21.09 
Low Financial Risk  N 29 28 27 
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(Relatively Small 
Investment Size) 
Mean 42.66 54.46 65.00 
S.D. 20.99 15.64 14.45 
 
Table 7 above shows the N, Mean, and S.D. for the primary dependent variables 
(i.e., recommend invest, relative time to recommend, and relative extent of consultation) 
related to the two individual independent variables: RMP type (robust or ceremonial) and 
financial risk level (high or low). Table 8 presents the same information by experimental 
cell, and Table 9 presents the results of t-tests by condition.  
Table 8: Descriptive Statistics – By Experimental Cell 
 
 
 
 
 
Independent Variables: 
 
Dependent Variables: 
 
 DV#1: 
Recommend 
Invest 
DV#2a: 
Relative 
Time to 
Recommend 
DV#2b: 
Relative 
Extent of 
Consultation 
Cell 1: Robust RMP and 
High Financial Risk 
n 14 14 13 
Mean 41.71 68.86 71.85 
S.D. 19.36 21.01 24.85 
Cell 2: Robust RMP and  
Low Financial Risk 
n 14 13 12 
Mean 39.57 52.92 68.08 
S.D. 23.27 16.93 14.73 
Cell 3: Ceremonial RMP 
and 
High Financial Risk 
n 17 17 17 
Mean 34.41 69.53 78.88 
S.D 24.25 19.28 17.89 
Cell 4: Ceremonial RMP 
and 
Low Financial Risk 
n 15 15 15 
Mean 45.53 55.80 62.53 
S.D. 18.96 14.90 14.24 
 
Table 9: Independent Samples Test 
 
 
Independent 
Variables 
 
Dependent  
Variables 
T-test for Equality of 
Group Means 
p-value (2-tailed) 
Robust/Ceremonial RMP Recommend Invest 0.857 
Time to Recommend 0.708 
Extent of Consultation 0.818 
High/Low Financial Risk Recommend Invest 0.379 
Time to Recommend   0.003* 
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Extent of Consultation   0.029* 
 
*T-test indicates a significant difference in the means of the DV for p-
value at the 0.05 level. 
 
In Table 7, the mean scores for the likelihood that participants would recommend 
that the Company make the case project investment of 40.64 for a robust RMP versus 
39.63 for a ceremonial RMP, and 37.71 for a relatively large investment size versus 42.66 
for a relatively small investment size, overall appear to reflect participant judgment 
conservatism. In addition, the S.D. ranging from 20.99 to 22.31 appears to indicate 
relatively high variability among individual participants about whether the Company 
should make the project investment.  
The mean scores for how much time it would take to make the case project 
investment recommendation (relative to a typical project investment) of 61.19 for a 
robust RMP versus 63.09 for a ceremonial RMP appear comparable; however, the mean 
score of 69.23 for a relatively high investment size is 14.77 points higher than the mean 
score of 54.46 for a relatively low investment size. This difference shows that 
participants would take more time (i.e., effort) to make recommendations for projects of 
relatively higher investment size (see Table 9; p = 0.003 for this difference). 
Additionally, the S.D. ranging from 15.64 to 20.47 again indicates notable individual 
participant variability. Similarly, the second dependent variable measuring judgment 
effort, relative extent of consultation, has comparable mean scores of 70.04 for a robust 
RMP and 71.22 for a ceremonial RMP; however, it also has a 10.83 higher mean score of 
75.83 for a relatively large investment size versus the mean score of 65.00 for a relatively 
small investment size, which once again reflects greater judgment effort (i.e., extent of 
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consultation) associated a relatively higher investment size (see Table 9; p = 0.029 for 
this difference). In this case, individual participant judgment variability is reflected in a 
S.D. ranging from 14.45 to 21.09.  
In summary, Tables 7-9 indicate comparable judgment conservatism mean scores 
related to RMP type and relative investment size, and comparable judgment effort mean 
scores related to RMP type, but notably higher judgment effort mean scores for relative 
investment size (i.e., financial risk level). 
Table 10: Descriptive Statistics – General Risk-Taking Propensity Scale (n = 60) 
 Response Ratings of 12 Risk-Taking 
Situation Questions Unrelated to Case 
Risk-Taking 
Activities  
Applied Now or  
in Your Adult Past 
1-5 Scale Anchors 
Mean for Responses 
to All 12 
Questions 
Mean for Responses 
to Individual 12 
Questions 
Participant Risk-
Taking 
Propensity Rating 
 
26.62 
(S.D. 7.16) 
 
2.22 
1 = Never 
2 = Rarely 
3 = Occasionally 
4 = Often 
5 = Very Often 
 
Note: General Risk-Taking Propensity Scale is based on Nicholson et al. (2005) Risk 
Taking Index. 
 
Table 10 above indicates the N, Mean, and S.D. for the risk-taking propensity 
scale. A mean of 26.62 (S.D. 7.16) is reported for the responses to all 12 questions about 
whether each of the scale’s six general risk-taking situations unrelated to the case applied 
to participants now or in their adult past (Nicholson et al., 2005). The mean for responses 
to individual 12 questions of 2.22 falls between the scale anchors “2 = Rarely” and “3 = 
Occasionally.” Because the case instrument asked participants to make a judgment 
involving different levels of financial risk (i.e., a relatively large versus a relatively small 
project investment size), I used participants’ general risk-taking propensity mean scores 
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for responses to all 12 questions from the Nicholson et al. (2005) Risk Taking Index as a 
control variable. However, as discussed below (Table 16), controlling for participants’ 
general risk-taking propensity did not affect the results of the study.      
Table 11: Descriptive Statistics – Other 0-100 Scale Variables 
  
N 
 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
0-100 Scale 
Anchors 
Extent the following factors affected your 
recommendation about whether the Company should 
make the project investment: 
Relative size of investment project 
Top managements’ attitude toward risk management 
Board of directors’ attitude toward risk management 
The employee appointed in charge of risk oversight 
Internal audit’s level of evaluation of the Company’s 
ERM program 
 
 
 
 
60 
59 
59 
59 
 
59 
 
 
 
75.10 
66.37 
64.25 
54.85 
 
47.95 
 
 
 
21.53 
20.91 
22.67 
25.11 
 
26.59 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 = Minimal 
50 = Moderate 
100 = Significant 
Extent you feel accountable to below parties for risk 
associated with recommendation about whether the 
Company should make the project investment: 
Top management 
Board of directors 
 
 
 
 
60 
60 
 
 
 
81.13 
69.48 
 
 
 
13.95 
25.66 
 
 
0 = Minimal 
50 = Moderate 
100 = Significant 
Extent that you believe the below parties are risk 
averse: 
Top management 
Board of directors 
 
 
60 
60 
 
 
59.00 
51.38 
 
 
23.28 
21.00 
 
0 = Minimal 
50 = Moderate 
100 = Significant 
 
Level of risk for this project investment 
 
60 66.13 20.65 0 = Low 
50 = Moderate 
100 = High 
 
Extent that you believe the below parties support 
Company’s ERM program: 
Board of directors 
Top management 
 
 
 
60 
60 
 
 
61.03 
52.82 
 
 
28.39 
30.74 
 
0 = Minimal 
50 = Moderate 
100 = Significant 
 
Primary focus of the risk management program(s) 
you have experienced in your career 
 
 
41 
 
59.00 
 
23.99 
0 = Primarily 
compliance-
based 
100 = Primarily 
risk-based 
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Extent of your professional experience in making 
project investment recommendations or decisions 
 
49 
 
71.35 
 
19.47 
0 = Minimal 
50 = Moderate 
100 = Significant 
 
Degree that your overall experience in making 
project investment recommendations or decisions 
has been favorable 
 
 
49 
 
 
75.16 
 
 
14.67 
0 = Very 
unfavorable 
100 = Very 
favorable 
 
 
Table 11 above provides the N, Mean, S.D., and scale anchors for other 0 – 100 
scale variables in order of the highest to lowest mean score for each variable. Factors that 
participants indicated most affected their recommendations about whether the Company 
should make the project investment were the relative size of the investment project (mean 
of 75.10, S.D. of 21.53), top managements’ attitude toward risk management (mean of 
66.37, S.D. of 20.91), and the board of directors’ attitude toward risk management (mean 
of 64.25, S.D. of 22.67). The employee appointed in charge of risk oversight (mean of 
54.85, S.D. of 25.11) had a moderate effect on participants’ recommendations, and 
internal audit’s level of evaluation of the Company’s ERM program (mean of 47.95, S.D. 
of 26.59) had a similar effect.  
Participants felt most accountable to top management for risk associated with 
their recommendation about whether the Company should make the project investment 
(mean of 81.13) and less accountable but still well above moderately accountable to the 
board of directors (mean of 69.48). In contrast, participants believed that the board of 
directors is more (t-test revealed significantly different means, p = 0.000) risk averse 
(mean of 59.00) than top management (mean of 51.28) and that the board of directors 
supports the Company’s ERM program (mean of 61.03) more (t-test revealed 
significantly different means, p = 0.000) than top management (mean of 52.82). 
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Participants also perceived moderate/high risk for the case project investment (mean of 
66.13).   
Participants were also asked whether they had any experience in their careers (1) 
working with a risk management program and (2) making project investment 
recommendations or decisions. The 41 participants with risk management program career 
experience were presented with the following: 
The focus of ERM programs varies among organizations. Some organizations  
merely focus on compliance with regulations (i.e., a compliance-based ERM  
focus), while other organizations also focus on effectively managing risks (i.e., a  
risk-based ERM focus). Please slide the bar below to indicate the primary focus of  
the risk management program(s) you have experienced in your career (0 =  
Primarily compliance-based ERM focus, 100 = Primarily risk-based ERM focus).    
Participants’ response mean of 59.00 (S.D. of 23.99) is consistent with risk management 
interview studies (e.g., Viscelli, 2013; Cohen et al., 2015) that support the existence of a 
compliance-based ERM focus (i.e., a ceremonial RMP from an institutional theory 
perspective) and a risk-based ERM focus (i.e., a robust RMP from an agency theory 
perspective) in practice. The practical relevance of both robust RMPs and ceremonial 
RMPs is strengthened further after considering that responding participants are financial 
professionals with career experience working with risk management program(s) and that 
the response mean (i.e., 59.00) is fairly close to the 0-100 scale mid-point of 50. 
However, a t-test indicates that the mean of 59.00 is significantly (p = 0.021) different 
from the 50.00 mid-point. The 41 participants’ responses included 24 primarily risk-
based (greater than the 50.00 scale mid-point), 4 neutral (at the 50.00 scale mid-point) 
and 13 primarily compliance-based (less than the 50.00 scale mid-point).  
 The 49 participants with career experience making project investment 
recommendations or decisions reported (1) a mean of 71.35 (S.D. of 19.47) for the extent 
62 
 
 
of such experience, and (2) a mean of 75.16 (S.D. 14.67) for the degree that such 
experience has been favorable, which indicates overall favorable (and perhaps successful) 
participant experience in this area.  
MANOVA Results 
 The study model includes multiple continuous 0-100 scale dependent variables 
(RECOMMEND INVEST, TIME TO RECOMMEND, EXTENT OF 
CONSULTATION) and nominal independent variables (RMP Type, Invest Size). The 
three dependent variables reflect different dimensions of an investment decision. In 
addition, dependent variables TIME TO RECOMMEND and EXTENT OF 
CONSULTATION are correlated (Pearson Correlation = .781, p-value = 0.000). As a 
result, I used MANOVA to assess the overall relationships.1  
 The MANOVA model is: 
[Judgment Conservatism (Likelihood You Recommend Invest), Judgment 
Effort (Relative Time to Recommend, Relative Extent of Consultation)] = 
f (RMP Type, Investment Size, RMP Type X Investment Size) 
 Table 12 below presents the results of the MANOVA.  
Table 12: MANOVA Model Results 
Judgment Conservatism (Likelihood You Recommend Invest), Judgment Effort (Relative 
Time to Recommend, Relative Extent of Consultation) = f (RMP Type, Investment Size, 
RMP Type X Investment Size) 
(n = 57) 
 
Effect F Sig. 
 
  
Model 
     0.096** 
 
 
 RMP Type 
.058 0.982 
                                                             
1 As discussed below (see Table 16), numerous control variables were considered, but they do not affect the 
conclusions. 
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  Investment Size 3.128   0.034* 
 RMP Type * Investment Size 1.769 0.165 
 
* **Model marginally significant for p-value at the 0.10 
level.   
*Significant for p-value at the 0.05 level. 
Note: Wilk’s Lambda results are reported in table. 
  
  
The MANOVA model is marginally significant (p-value = 0.096) and investment size is 
significant (F = 3.128, p-value = 0.034).2 Observed power for the three dependent 
variables (recommend invest, time to recommend, extent of consultation) is 1.00, which 
exceeds the typical 0.80 benchmark (e.g., UCLA, 2015). Based on the MANOVA results, 
none of the four pre-study hypotheses are supported because RMP type and the 
interaction of RMP type and investment size are not significant. Specifically, the RMP 
type (i.e., robust or ceremonial), and the interaction of the RMP type and the investment 
size (i.e., relatively large or small), failed to significantly affect the likelihood that the 
study participants would recommend that the Company make the case project investment. 
Only the investment size is significant. Chapter 5 offers possible reasons for and 
implications of these results. The results of ANOVAs related to the primary and other 
dependent variables are discussed next.      
ANOVAs Related to Primary Dependent Variables 
 I next use individual ANOVAs for judgment conservatism (recommend invest), 
judgment effort (time to invest), and judgment effort (extent of consultation). Table 13 
below presents that the ANOVA model for judgment conservatism (recommend invest) is 
not significant (F = 0.732, p-value = 0.537, adjusted R-squared = 0.014), nor are any of 
                                                             
2 Results are similar if those failing a manipulation check are included (n = 84 due to missing data), except 
that the model is p = 0.006. Investment size is significant at p < 0.001. 
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the individual independent variables (RMP type, investment size, RMP type X 
investment size) significantly related to judgment conservatism. Therefore, Hypotheses 
H1 (i.e., financial professionals of companies with a robust RMP will make more 
conservative financial investment business decisions than financial professionals with a 
ceremonial RMP) and H3 (i.e., the effect of robust RMP on financial investment 
judgment conservatism is greater when the level of financial risk is high than when the 
level of financial risk is low) are not supported by the ANOVA results. These results are 
consistent with the MANOVA results presented earlier.  
Table 13 – ANOVA Results (Judgment Conservatism) 
DV = Likelihood You Would Recommend to Make Financial Investment 
(n = 60) 
 
Source df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 3 344.421 0.732 0.537 
Intercept 1 96872.117 205.828 0.000 
RMP Type 1 6.697 0.014 0.905 
Investment Size 1 300.421 0.638 0.428 
RMP Type * Investment 
Size 
1 655.661 1.393 0.243 
Error 56 470.645   
Total 60    
Corrected Total 59    
 
R Squared = 0.038 (Adjusted R Squared = -0.014) 
 
       
 
Table 14 below shows that the ANOVA model for judgment effort (time to 
invest) is significant (F = 3.286, p-value = 0.027, adjusted R-squared = 0.106). However, 
the individual independent variables RMP type and the interaction of RMP type and 
investment size are not significantly related to judgment effort (relative time to invest). 
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Therefore, hypotheses H2 (i.e., financial professionals of companies with a robust RMP 
will exert more effort while making financial investment business decisions than 
financial professionals of companies with a ceremonial RMP) and H4 (i.e., the effect of 
robust RMP on financial investment judgment effort is greater when the level of financial 
risk is high than when the level of financial risk is low) are not supported by the ANOVA 
results. However, a significant relationship (F = 9.695, p-value = 0.003) was found 
between investment size and judgment effort (relative time to invest), with a 0 – 100 
scale judgment effort (relative time to invest) mean of 69.23 (S.D. of 19.74, N. of 31) for 
the relatively large investment condition and a corresponding mean of 54.46 (S.D. of 
15.64, N. of 28) for the relatively small investment condition. These results are consistent 
with the MANOVA results presented earlier. It appears that neither RMP type nor 
investment size effects participants’ judgment conservatism, and only investment size has 
any significant effect on participants’ judgment effort.  
Table 14: ANOVA Results (Judgment Effort – Relative Time to Invest) 
DV = Relative Time You Would Take to Develop a Recommendation 
(n = 59) 
Source df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 3 1088.954 3.286 0.027** 
Intercept 1 222986.995 672.780     0.000 
RMP Type 1 46.000 0.139     0.711 
Investment Size 1 3213.249 9.695     0.003* 
RMP Type * Investment 
Size 
1 17.749 0.054     0.818 
Error 55 331.441   
Total 59    
Corrected Total 58    
 
 R Squared = 0.152 (Adjusted R Squared = 0.106) 
 **Model significant for p-value at the 0.05 level. 
 * Significant for p-value at the 0.05 level. 
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Table 15 below indicates that the ANOVA model for judgment effort (extent of 
consultation) is marginally significant (F = 2.227, p-value = 0.096, adjusted R-squared = 
0.062). However, the individual independent variables RMP type and the interaction of 
RMP type and investment size are not significantly related to judgment effort (relative 
extent of consultation). Therefore, once again hypotheses H2 (i.e., financial professionals 
of companies with a robust RMP will exert more effort while making financial 
investment business decisions than financial professionals of companies with a 
ceremonial RMP) and H4 (i.e., the effect of robust RMP on financial investment 
judgment effort is greater when the level of financial risk is high than when the level of 
financial risk is low) are not supported by the ANOVA results. However, a significant 
relationship (F =- 4.226, p-value = 0.045) was found between investment size and 
judgment effort (relative extent of consultation), with a 0 – 100 scale judgment effort 
(relative extent of consultation) mean of 75.83 (S.D. of 21.09, N. of 30) for the relatively 
large investment condition and a corresponding mean of 65.00 (S.D. of 14.52, N. of 27) 
for the relatively small investment condition. These ANOVA results for judgment effort 
(relative extent of consultation) are consistent with the MANOVA results and the 
ANOVA results for judgment effort (relative time to invest) presented earlier.  
Table 15 ANOVA Results (Judgment Effort – Relative Extent of Consultation) 
DV = Relative Extent that You Would Consult with Others to Develop Recommendation 
(n = 57) 
Source df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 3 745.941 2.227 0.096** 
Intercept 1 277011.537 826.942    0.000 
RMP Type 1 7.730 0.023    0.880 
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Investment Size 1 1415.541 4.226    0.045* 
RMP Type * Investment 
Size 
1 554.381 1.655    0.204 
Error 53 334.983   
Total 57    
Corrected Total 56    
 
R Squared = 0.112 (Adjusted R Squared = 0.062) 
 **Model marginally significant for p-value at the 0.10 level. 
 *Significant for p-value at the 0.05 level. 
 
                    
 
Table 16 below lists possible control variables considered in this study. Adding 
each of these possible control variables one at a time to the MANOVA model did not 
change the significance of any relationships between the independent variables (1) RMP 
type, (2) investment size, or (3) the interaction between RMP type and investment size 
and the primary dependent variables (1) judgment conservatism (likelihood to 
recommend making the project investment) and (2) judgment effort (relative time and 
relative extent of consultation to make recommendation). Therefore, the final MANOVA 
model excluded these possible control variables. The list of possible control variables 
were derived from common control variables used in accounting experiments (e.g.,  
gender, years of professional experience, current title, professional certifications, 
education, industry segment, revenue of employer) and variables specific to this study 
(i.e., RMP program experience, project investment experience, early or late responders, 
and general risk-taking propensity).  
TABLE 16: List of Possible Control Variables 
 
Variable Name Description 
Gender Male or female  
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Years of professional 
experience 
Measured in years  
RMP program experience Yes or no 
Project investment 
experience 
Yes or no 
Current title Current job title (i.e., CFO, Financial Manager, 
Controller, Assistant Controller, Staff Accountant, 
External Auditor, Internal Auditor, Other) 
Professional certifications Professional certifications (i.e., CMA, CPA, CFA, Other, 
None) 
Education Highest educational degree (i.e., Bachelor’s, Master’s, 
Law, Doctoral)  
Industry segment Segment currently work (i.e., public company, private 
for-profit company, not-for-profit, government, public 
accounting, other) 
Revenue of employer Approximate annual revenue of employer (i.e., less than 
$10 million, $10 million to $100 million, $101 million to 
$500 million, $501 million to $1 billion, more than $1 
billion) 
Early or late responders Participants completing instrument earlier or later 
General risk-taking 
propensity 
Participants’ individual general risk-taking propensity 
overall score based on Nicholson et al. (2005) Risk 
Taking Index scale 
 
In summary, the ANOVA results do not support H1, H2, H3, or H4. There is no 
evidence that RMP type affects investment decisions or related effort, nor is there any 
evidence of an interaction between RMP type and investment size. However, a significant 
relationship, not previously hypothesized, between the investment size and judgment 
effort (measured separately by relative time and extent of consultation) was revealed. 
Investment size appears to affect the level judgment effort, but not the level of judgment 
conservatism, while RMP type appears to have no effect on either the level of judgment 
effort or the level of judgment conservatism.  
Do these findings suggest that financial professionals view all RMPs as a sort of a 
ceremonial activity of creating the appearances of a bona fide risk management program, 
but in practice such RMPs do not effect actual financial investment decision-making, and 
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that investment size alone significantly effects the time it takes and the extent of 
consultation sought in order to evaluate and to recommend whether to make a project 
investment? The judgments made by this study’s accounting professional participants, 
many with career experience working with risk management programs and making 
project investment decisions, appear consistent with this conclusion that risk management 
programs are to be complied with but do not impact real-world, actual investment 
recommendations or decisions – but additional research is needed before definitive 
conclusions are drawn. The relationship of RMP type and investment size to other 
dependent variables is examined next. 
Significant ANOVA Models Related to Other Dependent Variables 
 In order to better understand and interpret this study’s main findings related to the 
four hypotheses, the following sections examine the ANOVA results of other dependent 
variables with a significant or a marginally significant model.  
Board of directors’ and top managements’ attitude toward risk management. In 
Table 17 below, the ANOVA model for BOARD RISK ATTITUDE (i.e., extent the 
board of directors’ attitude toward risk management affected your recommendation about 
whether the Company should make the project investment) was significant (F = 3.209, p-
value = 0.030, adjusted R-squared = 0.103). Furthermore, a significant relationship (F = 
8.054, p-value = 0.006) was found between investment size and BOARD RISK 
ATTITUDE. In order to understand the directional effect of investment size on the extent 
the board of directors’ attitude toward risk management affected participants’ investment 
recommendations, Table 18 below presents the N, means, and S.D. for the dependent 
variable BOARD RISK ATTITUDE on a scale from 0 to 100 (0 = minimal effect, 50 = 
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moderate effect, and 100 = significant effect). Participants assigned to the relatively small 
investment size condition had a mean of 56.07 for the extent that the board of directors’ 
attitude toward risk management affected the participants’ recommendation. In contrast, 
participants assigned to the relatively large investment size had a 71.65 (15.58 points 
higher) mean on this factor.   
Table 17: ANOVA Results 
DV = Extent Board of Directors’ Attitude toward Risk Management Affected 
Recommendation 
(n = 59) 
 
Source df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 3 1480.125 3.209 0.030** 
Intercept 1 240222.593 520.807    0.000 
RMP Type 1 872.070 1.891    0.175 
Investment Size 1 3715.033 8.054    0.006* 
RMP Type * Investment Size 1 2.664 0.006    0.940 
Error 55 461.251   
Total 59    
Corrected Total 58    
 
R Squared = 0.149 (Adjusted R Squared = 0.103) 
 **Model significant for p-value at the 0.05 level. 
 *Significant for p-value at the 0.05 level. 
 
                     
Table 18: Compare Means 
IV = Investment Size (relatively large or relatively small) 
DV = Extent Board of Directors’ Attitude toward Risk Management Affected 
Recommendation 
 
  
N 
 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
0=100 Scale Anchors 
Relatively Small Investment Size 
 
28 56.07 25.19  
0 = Minimal Effect 
50 = Moderate Effect 
100 = Significant Effect 
Relatively Large Investment Size 
 
31 71.65 17.42 
Total 59 64.25 22.67 
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Similarly, Table 19 below reveals that the ANOVA model for the dependent 
variable TOP MANAGEMENT RISK ATTITUDE (i.e., extent top managements’ 
attitude toward risk management affected your recommendation about whether the 
Company should make the project investment) was marginally significant (F = 2.209, p-
value = 0.097, adjusted R-squared = 0.059). Furthermore, a significant relationship (F= 
4.566, p-value = 0.037) was indicated between investment size and TOP 
MANAGEMENT RISK ATTITUDE. Once again, in order to understand the directional 
effect of investment size on the extent top managements’ attitude toward risk 
management affected participants’ investment recommendations, Table 20 below 
presents the N, means, and S.D. for the dependent variable TOP MANAGEMENT RISK 
ATTITUDE on a scale from 0 to 100 (0 = minimal effect, 50 = moderate effect, and 100 
= significant effect). Participants assigned to the relatively small investment size 
condition had a mean of 56.07 for the extent that the board of directors’ attitude toward 
risk management affected the participants’ recommendations. In contrast, participants 
assigned to the relatively large investment size condition had a 71.65 (15.58 points 
higher) mean on this factor.   
Table 19 ANOVA Results 
DV = Extent Top Managements’ Attitude toward Risk Management Affected 
Recommendation 
(n = 59) 
 
Source df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 3 909.190 2.209 0.097** 
Intercept 1 257849.578 626.450  0.000 
RMP Type 1 894.531 2.173  0.146 
Investment Size 1 1879.358 4.566  0.037* 
RMP Type * Investment Size 1 78.501 0.191  0.664 
Error 55 411.604   
Total 59    
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Corrected Total 58    
 
 R Squared = 0.108 (Adjusted R Squared = 0.059) 
 **Model marginally significant for p-value at the 0.10 level. 
 *Significant for p-value at the 0.05 level. 
 
                          
 
Table 20: Compare Means 
IV = Investment Size (relatively large or relatively small) 
DV = Extent Top Managements’ Attitude toward Risk Management Affected 
Recommendation 
 
 N Mean S.D. 0=100 Scale Anchors 
Relatively Small Investment Size 
 
28 60.68 23.16  
0 = Minimal Effect 
50 = Moderate Effect 
100 = Significant Effect 
Relatively Large Investment Size 
 
31 71.52 17.47 
Total 59 66.37 20.91 
 
In summary, the results in Tables 17, 18, 19 and 20 suggest that participants’ 
perceptions of the board of directors’ and top managements’ attitude toward risk 
management were affected by investment size (i.e., such attitudes were greater for a 
relatively large investment size than for a relatively small investment size).  
Feelings of accountability to the board of directors and top management. Table 21 
below likewise reports that the ANOVA model for the dependent variable 
ACCOUNTABLE TO BOARD (i.e., extent you feel accountable to the board of directors 
for the risk associated with your recommendation about whether the Company should 
make the project investment) was significant (F = 3.513, p-value = 0.021, adjusted R-
squared = 0.113). Furthermore, a significant relationship (F = 8.023, p-value = 0.006) 
was revealed between investment size and ACCOUNTABLE TO BOARD. Table 22 
below presents the N, means, and S.D. for the dependent variable ACCOUNTABLE TO 
BOARD on a scale from 0 to 100 (0 = minimal accountability, 50 = moderate 
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accountability, and 100 = significant accountability). Participants assigned to the 
relatively small investment size condition had a mean of 60.28 for the extent that they felt 
accountable to the board of directors for the risk associated with the participants’ 
recommendations. In contrast, participants assigned to the relatively large investment size 
condition had a 78.10 (17.82 points higher) mean on this factor.  
Table 21: ANOVA Results 
DV = Extent Feel Accountable to Board of Directors for Risk Associated with 
Recommendation 
(n = 60)   
 
Source df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 3 2051.759 3.513 0.021** 
Intercept 1 286960.780 491.346   0.000 
RMP Type 1 1014.784 1.738   0.193 
Investment Size 1 4685.747 8.023   0.006* 
RMP Type * Investment Size 1 418.932 0.717   0.401 
Error 56 584.030   
Total 60    
Corrected Total 59    
 
 R Squared = 0.158 (Adjusted R Squared = 0.113) 
 **Model significant for p-value at the 0.05 level. 
 *Significant for p-value at the 0.05 level. 
 
                
 
Table 22: Compare Means 
IV = Investment Size (relatively large or relatively small) 
DV = Extent Felt Accountable to Board of Directors for the Risk Associated with 
Recommendation 
 
 N Mean S.D. 0=100 Scale Anchors 
Relatively Small Investment 
Size 
29 60.28 28.21 
 
0 = Minimal Accountability 
50 = Moderate Accountability 
100 = Significant 
Accountability 
Relatively Large Investment 
Size 
31 78.10 19.85 
 
Total 60 69.48 25.66 
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Similarly, Table 23 below shows that the ANOVA model for the dependent 
variable ACCOUNTABLE TO TOP MANAGEMENT (i.e., extent you feel accountable 
to top management for the risk associated with your recommendation about whether the 
Company should make the project investment) was significant (F = 3.515, p-value = 
0.021, adjusted R-squared = 0.113). In this case, a significant relationship (F = 4.997, p-
value = 0.029) was indicated between RMP type and ACCOUNTABLE TO TOP 
MANAGEMENT, and a marginally significant relation (p-value = 0.069) was found 
between investment size and ACCOUNTABLE TO TOP MANAGEMENT. Tables 24 
and 25 below present the related N, means, and S.D. for the dependent variable 
ACCOUNTABLE TO TOP MANAGEMENT on a scale from 0 to 100 (0 = minimal 
accountability, 50 = moderate accountability, and 100 = significant accountability). 
Participants assigned to a ceremonial RMP condition had a mean of 77.75 for the extent 
that they felt accountable to top management for the risk associated with the participants’ 
recommendations. In contrast, participants assigned to the robust RMP condition had an 
85.00 (7.25 points higher) mean on this factor. In addition, participants assigned to the 
relatively small investment size condition had a mean of 77.83 for the extent that they felt 
accountable to top management for the risk associated with the participants’ 
recommendations. In contrast, participants assigned to the relatively large investment size 
condition had a mean of 84.23 (6.40 points higher) mean on this factor. 
Table 23: ANOVA Results 
DV = Extent Feel Accountable to Top Management for Risk Associated with 
Recommendation 
(n = 60) 
 
Source df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 3 606.210 3.515 0.021*** 
Intercept 1 393109.712 2279.297 0.000 
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RMP Type 1 861.862 4.997 0.029** 
Investment Size 1 592.674 3.436 0.069* 
RMP Type * Investment Size 1 375.622 2.178 0.146 
Error 56 172.470   
Total 60    
Corrected Total 59    
 
 R Squared = 0.158 (Adjusted R Squared = 0.113) 
 ***Model significant for p-value at the 0.05 level. 
 **Significant for p-value at the 0.05 level. 
 *Marginally significant for p-value at the 0.10 level. 
 
Table 24: Compare Means 
IV = RMP Type (robust or ceremonial) 
DV = Extent Felt Accountable to Top Management for the Risk Associated with 
Recommendation 
 
 N Mean S.D. 0=100 Scale Anchors 
Ceremonial RMP 32 77.75 15.18 
 
0 = Minimal Accountability 
50 = Moderate Accountability 
100 = Significant 
Accountability 
Robust RMP 28 85.00 11.46 
 
Total 60 81.13 13.95 
 
Table 25: Compare Means 
IV = Investment Size (relatively large or relatively small) 
DV = Extent Felt Accountable to Top Management for the Risk Associated with 
Recommendation 
 
 N Mean S.D. 0=100 Scale Anchors 
Relatively Small Investment 
Size 
29 77.83 14.86 
 
0 = Minimal Accountability 
50 = Moderate Accountability 
100 = Significant 
Accountability 
Relatively Large Investment 
Size 
31 84.23 12.49 
 
Total 60 81.13 13.95 
 
In summary, the results in Tables 21 and 22 suggest that participants felt 
significantly more accountable to the board of directors for the risk associated with the 
participants’ recommendations for a relatively large investment size than for a relatively 
small investment size. Tables 23, 24, and 25 suggest that participants felt marginally 
76 
 
 
significantly more accountable to top management for the risk associated with the 
participants’ recommendations for a relatively large investment size than for a relatively 
small investment size. Participants also felt significantly more accountable to top 
management under a robust RMP than a ceremonial RMP. In any case, such feelings of 
accountability to the board of directors or to top management were not great enough to 
influence the actual investment recommendation made.        
Extent believe top management is risk averse. Finally, Table 26 below indicates 
that the ANOVA model for the dependent variable TOP MANAGEMENT RISK 
AVERSE (i.e., extent that you believe top management is risk averse) was significant (F 
= 2.926, p-value = 0.042, adjusted R-squared = 0.089). Additionally, a significant 
relationship (F = 6.868, p-value = 0.011) was revealed between RMP type and TOP 
MANAGEMENT RISK AVERSE. Table 27 below presents the N, means, and S.D. for 
the dependent variable TOP MANAGEMENT RISK AVERSE on a scale from 0 to 100 
(0 = minimal risk aversion, 50 = moderate risk aversion, and 100 = significant risk 
aversion). Participants assigned to the ceremonial RMP condition had a mean of 45.19 
for the extent they believed that top management was risk averse. In contrast, participants 
assigned to the robust RMP condition had a 58.46 (13.27 points higher) mean on this 
factor.  
Table 26: ANOVA Results 
DV = Extent Believe Top Management is Risk Averse 
(n = 60) 
 
Source df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 3 1175.582 2.926 0.042** 
Intercept 1 159132.041 396.072   0.000 
RMP Type 1 2759.239 6.868   0.011* 
Investment Size 1 312.710 0.778   0.381 
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RMP Type * Investment Size 1 525.478 1.308   0.258 
Error 56 401.776   
Total 60    
Corrected Total 59    
 
 R Squared = 0.136 (Adjusted R Squared = 0.089) 
 **Model significant for p-value at the 0.05 level. 
 *Significant for p-value at the 0.05 level. 
 
Table 27: Compare Means 
IV = RMP Type (robust or ceremonial) 
DV = Extent Believe Top Management is Risk Averse 
 
 N Mean S.D. 0=100 Scale Anchors 
Ceremonial RMP 32 45.19 19.80 
 
0 = Minimal Risk Aversion 
50 = Moderate Risk Aversion 
100 = Significant Risk 
Aversion 
Robust RMP 28 58.46 20.41 
 
Total 60 51.38 21.00 
 
In summary, these results suggest that participants assigned to a robust RMP 
believed top management was significantly more risk averse than participants assigned to 
a ceremonial RMP. However, as in the earlier cases, such beliefs were not sufficient to 
influence the actual investment recommendation made.  
Factors Considered in Participants’ Responses 
 Particular themes emerged from a review of the participants’ responses describing 
factors that they considered in deciding about whether the Company should make the 
case project investment, as well as about how much time and the extent of consultation 
that they would need to decide, and with whom they would consult.  
 Financial investment size. The relative size of the project investment was 
identified as a key factor in both the investment recommendation that participants 
made/would make and in the effort (relative time and extent of consultation) that 
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participants’ would exert. For example, factors considered by participants apparently 
assigned to the relatively large investment size condition included “since the investment 
amount is big, the risk is also higher,” “it’s a large investment so it has a much bigger 
effect on the company as a whole,” and “given the size and potential impact of the 
investment, more time is warranted.” In contrast, factors considered by participants 
apparently assigned to the relatively small investment size condition included “as a 
smaller capital investment, (it) has only a modest, not large, impact on the company’s 
ability to achieve overall profit objectives” and “average time (to make recommendation) 
due to this being a small project.”  
Marketing personnel views. Participants indicated the marketing personnel’s 
mixed views about whether the new product introduction will meet the Company’s 
required return on investment as a factor in the participants’ recommendation and in the 
related effort that they would exert. For example, participants’ responses included “the 
marketing group (a usually optimistic group) does not feel confident of achieving the 6% 
return” and “it sounds like Marketing is not fully committed to the market demand.” 
Additional responses reference that the new product is not yet widely accepted in the 
market and the need for a higher selling price to attain normal margins (as stated in the 
case). 
Take advantage of new opportunity. Participants also commented on the possible 
advantages of making the new product investment. For example, participants indicated 
factors such as “the potential competitive advantage of the new product in the 
marketplace and the longer range potential for generating higher profits,” “if (the 
Company) doesn’t take the opportunity, a competitor is likely to,” and “if this (new 
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product/technology) is trending and we do not capitalize early, we (may) lose out on the 
market share.” 
Consult many parties before making recommendation. Participants most 
frequently identified marketing/sales and production/manufacturing personnel as the 
parties that participants would consult. However, participants consistently named that 
they would consult with a wide range of people both internally and externally (customers, 
retail stores, raw materials suppliers, etc.). For example, one participant responded 
“virtually all areas of the company should have input, sales (what can we sell this for?), 
marketing (is there demand for this and where?), engineering (design and functionality), 
manufacturing (cost to produce), accounting (profitability analysis), risk/legal (any safety 
concerns for the consumer, liabilities to us).”        
The next section presents the study’s conclusion, implications, limitations, and 
opportunities for further research. 
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CHAPTER 5  
CONCLUSION, IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
 This study examined the effects of risk management programs (RMPs) on 
financial professionals’ project investment judgment conservatism and effort. 
Specifically, an online instrument was administered to experienced financial 
professionals who were randomly assigned into either a robust RMP or a ceremonial 
RMP and then into either a high financial risk or a low financial risk condition. 
Participants were then asked to indicate the likelihood that they would recommend to 
make a financial project investment and how much time and the extent they would 
consult with others to make their recommendation. Based primarily on agency and 
accountability theories, I predicted that participants in a robust RMP would make more 
conservative recommendations and require more time and consult with more people than 
participants in a ceremonial RMP, and that this effect would be greater in a high financial 
risk level than in a low financial risk level.  
Conclusion 
 The study results did not support any of the four hypotheses. No significant 
relationship was revealed between RMP type (i.e., robust or ceremonial), or between the 
interaction of RMP type and financial risk level (i.e., high or low – indicated by a 
relatively large or small investment size), and the degree of judgment conservatism 
(likelihood participants would recommend to make a financial project investment) or 
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judgment effort (relative time and relative extent of consultation needed to make their 
recommendation). Furthermore, these results remained unchanged after adding several 
possible control variables, including participants’ gender, years of professional 
experience, current title, professional certifications, education (highest degree), industry 
segment, company revenues, early and later study responders, and a general risk-taking 
propensity (based on Nicholson et al. 2005 Risk Taking Index scale). However, a 
significant relationship was found between investment size alone and judgment effort 
(relative time and relative consultation to make the project investment recommendation).  
While I cannot conclude that RMP type does not affect financial professionals’ 
judgment conservative or judgment effort, the null hypothesis that RMP type has no 
effect on such judgment conservatism and effort cannot be rejected based on the results 
of this study. One interpretation of these findings may be that in practice RMPs often are 
essentially ceremonial (supported by institutional theory) developed primarily to create 
the appearance of an organization-wide, integrated risk management approach and to 
demonstrate compliance with regulations (e.g., COSO, 2004; NYSE, 2013), while not 
affecting management behavior or decision-making (e.g., the actual financial investment 
project decisions). A more positive interpretation of these findings may be that ERM does 
indeed promote an effective, responsible, organization-wide and integrated approach to 
risk management without interfering with necessary, healthy, entrepreneurial risk-taking 
decisions and activities (within the organization’s risk appetite) that is required to achieve 
entity objectives. More research is needed on these issues. 
In addition to examining the effects of RMP type and investment size on the 
study’s primary dependent variables of judgment conservatism and judgment effort, 
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additional ANOVA models revealed significant or marginally significant relationships 
between RMP type and/or investment size and other dependent variables. For example, 
investment size was significantly related to the extent that participants’ recommendations 
were affected by the Boards’ attitude toward risk management and the extent participants 
felt accountable to the Board. Similarly, investment size was marginally related to the 
extent that participants’ recommendations were affected by top managements’ attitude 
toward risk management and the extent participants felt accountable to top management. 
However, RMP type was also significantly related only to the extent participants felt 
accountable to top management and to the extent that participants believed top 
management was risk averse. However, none of these additional significant relationships 
involving other dependent variables were sufficient to influence participants’ actual 
project investment recommendations.         
Implications 
 This study’s results offer implications for practitioners, policymakers, and 
academics. First, the study’s results inform practitioners. Specifically, while COSO 
(2004) defines ERM by relating organization-wide risks to the achievement of entity 
objectives, in practice this does not necessarily mean that ERM should constrain healthy, 
entrepreneurial risk-taking in management decision-making (e.g., project investment 
decisions) within the entity’s risk appetite. Second, policymakers (e.g., SEC, COSO, 
NYSE) should carefully consider the results of this study to better understand the 
possible impact of risk management regulations and guidelines on public company 
project investment decision-making, extent that the board’s and top management’s risk 
management attitude affects financial decision-making, financial professionals’ feelings 
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of accountability to top management for risk associated with financial recommendations, 
and financial professionals’ beliefs about top management risk aversion.  
 Finally, as the first study that I am aware of to examine the effects of risk 
management programs on financial professional judgments and decision-making, this 
study has implications for academic research and theory. Specifically, this study uses 
accountability and agency theories to hypothesize more conservative financial 
professional judgments within a robust RMP (a higher risk management accountability 
condition than a ceremonial RMP). While greater levels of accountability resulted in 
greater judgment conservatism and effort in many auditor studies (e.g., Asare et al., 2000; 
DeZoort et al., 2006; Koonce et al., 1995), in the present study greater ERM 
accountability (represented by a robust RMP versus a ceremonial RMP) did not produce 
such a relationship. This finding of no relationship between RMP type and financial 
professional judgment conservatism appears consistent with institutional theory. Perhaps 
in the marketplace the applicability of agency theory or institutional theory may depend 
on the corporate subject matter and/or the governance players involved. In addition, the 
results of this study do not appear to be consistent with the acceptability heuristic 
(Tetlock: 1992, 1985; Mero et al., 2007), which advances a strategy of coping with 
accountability by making judgments that are acceptable to the parties to whom an 
individual is accountable. In the present study, a significant relationship was found 
between RMP type and both the extent participants felt accountable to top management 
and the extent participants believed top management was risk averse, yet no relationship 
was indicated between RMP type and judgment conservatism (likelihood participants 
would make recommend that the Company make the project investment).  
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Limitations 
 This study is subject to several standard limitations applicable to experimental 
design and survey research based on case study material. These limitations include 
external validity, representativeness of the participant group, the potential for demand 
effects, and small sample size. In addition, the robust RMP condition in the experiment 
intentionally describes characteristics of an ERM process with a primary goal of 
effectively managing organizational risks (i.e., ERM support of top management and the 
board, appointment of an active and qualified CRO, and internal audit focused on ERM 
evaluation). In contrast, the ceremonial RMP condition in the experiment intentionally 
describes characteristics of an ERM process with a primary goal of merely creating the 
appearances of a regulatory-compliant ERM (i.e., approval but lack of support of RMP 
by top management and the board, appointment of an individual lacking ERM experience 
to oversee the low-priority RMP program, and internal audit not focused on ERM 
evaluation). However, in practice there is evidence of elements of both a robust and a 
ceremonial RMP (e.g., Viscelli, 2013; Cohen et al., 2015) existing simultaneously within 
the same organization. Another limitation of the study is the limited information that is 
provided to participants on which to base their recommendation. Although the instrument 
was examined and pre-tested by practicing professionals and risk management experts to 
ensure that relevant and realistic case information was included, the time constraints of 
the experiment necessarily limits the quantity of information that can be provided. 
Finally, although there have been calls for more ERM research, ERM experimental 
studies are new. As additional research is performed, greater understanding of the most 
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effective experimental design for this area may be available that will address certain 
limitations.  
Future Research 
This study responds to previous calls for academic research on ERM and 
decision-making (e.g., Omega: The International Journal of Management Science) and 
on ERM and corporate governance (e.g., Journal of Enterprise Risk Management). 
Additional research may involve other key ERM corporate players as participants, such 
as board members, senior management, and auditors. Gaining insights into the 
perspectives and judgments of these other ERM participants will expand our 
understanding of ERM and management decision-making, as well as the motivations and 
academic theories on which those decisions are based.
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From: IMA Director of Research 
Subject: Participation in an IMA Award Winning Study Performed by a KSU Doctoral 
Candidate 
Dear IMA Members: 
I am writing to ask for your help in an online study being conducted by Jim Boyle, a 
Doctor of Business Administration (DBA) student at Kennesaw State University. This 
study is part of Jim’s dissertation research focused on improving our understanding of 
financial managers’ judgments.  
 
The study has been awarded a grant through the IMA Research Foundation’s Doctoral 
Student Grant Program and is being performed under the oversight of Institutional 
Review Boards at the University of Scranton and Kennesaw State University, as well as 
his dissertation committee (Dr. Dana Hermanson, Dr. Todd DeZoort, and Dr. Jennifer 
Schafer).  
 
Your participation is very important to the success of this study. I encourage you to 
click on the link below to complete the study, which should take approximately 20-25 
minutes. 
 
Everyone who completes the study will be eligible to enter a drawing to win one (1) 
of three $100 American Express gift certificates. 
 
Your responses will remain strictly confidential and will be analyzed only after being 
combined with the responses of other participants. The researchers will not disclose your 
name or any other identifying information, and they will not collect IP addresses. 
 
Please click the link below to begin the study. 
 
https://scranton.co1.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_0p0iv3QZb38UKAB 
 
Thank you for your support. 
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From: IMA Director of Research 
Subject: SECOND REQUEST - What are your thoughts on financial managers’ 
judgments?   
Dear IMA Member, 
This is a follow-up to my October 31st email. If you have already participated in the 
study, thank you and please disregard this message.  If you have not yet participated, we 
would greatly appreciate your participation in this important research! 
 
Can you spare less than 30 minutes to provide your thoughts on financial managers’ 
judgments?  Everyone who completes this study is eligible to enter a drawing to win 
one (1) of three $100 American Express gift certificates. Click this link to participate 
in the study. 
 
As part of his dissertation research, Jim Boyle, a Doctor of Business Administration 
(DBA) student at Kennesaw State University, is conducting research that focuses on 
improving our understanding of financial managers’ judgments. The study has been 
awarded a grant through the IMA Research Foundation’s Doctoral Student Grant 
Program and is being performed under the oversight of Institutional Review Boards at the 
University of Scranton and Kennesaw State University, as well as his dissertation 
committee (Dr. Dana Hermanson, Dr. Todd DeZoort, and Dr. Jennifer Schafer).  
 
Your participation is very important to the success of this study and the improvement of 
our profession’s understanding of financial managers’ judgments. I encourage you to 
complete the study by clicking this link. The study should take approximately 20-25 
minutes to complete. 
 
Your responses will remain strictly confidential and will be analyzed only after being 
combined with the responses of the other participants. The researchers will not disclose 
your name or any other identifying information, and they will not collect IP addresses. 
 
Please click https://scranton.co1.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_0p0iv3QZb38UKAB to 
begin the study. 
 
Thank you for your thoughts and your support of this important research. 
 
 
 
 
 
95 
 
 
 
From: IMA Director of Research 
Subject: FINAL REQUEST – RECEIVE VALUABLE RESEARCH RESULTS 
FOR YOUR FIRM  
Dear IMA Members: 
I am writing one last time to ask for your help for a doctoral student at Kennesaw State 
University (Jim Boyle). He is conducting a very interesting study that focuses on 
improving our understanding of financial managers’ judgments. The study has been 
awarded a grant through the IMA Research Foundation’s Doctoral Student Grant 
Program.  This study is also part of Jim’s dissertation research and your help is very 
much needed to ensure an adequate sample size for project success.  
 
As a participant, you will have the opportunity to receive a summary of the results that 
may help your firm’s financial managers’ judgments. In addition, you will be eligible to 
win one (1) of three $100 American Express gift certificates. 
 
I encourage you to click on the link below to complete the study, which should take 
approximately 20-25 minutes. Your responses will be completely confidential and will 
be analyzed only after being combined with the responses of other participants. The 
researchers will not disclose your name or any other identifying information. 
 
Study Link:   https://scranton.co1.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_0p0iv3QZb38UKAB 
 
Thank you for your help with this important research project. 
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Q1 
 
  
Consent to Participate in “A Study of Financial Managers’ Judgments” 
 
James F. Boyle, CPA, MBA 
Assistant Professor of Accounting 
The University of Scranton 
james.boyle@scranton.edu 
(570) 955-6924 
Dana R. Hermanson, Ph.D. 
Professor of Accounting 
Kennesaw State University 
dhermans@kennesaw.edu 
(770) 423-6077 
Todd DeZoort, Ph.D., 
CFE 
Professor of Accounting 
The University of 
Alabama 
tdezoort@cba.ua.edu 
(205) 348-6694 
  We are performing a study to better understand financial managers’ project investment 
judgments. This study is funded by the Institute of Management Accountants (IMA) 
Research Foundation. There are no risks from completing the study. 
  
We realize that your time is valuable, and to show our appreciation, you have the 
opportunity to opt-in to a drawing to win a $100 American Express gift certificate (three 
certificates will be awarded). Upon completion of the study, you will be prompted to 
participate in this drawing. 
  
While you will receive no direct benefit for participating, you will be contributing to our 
understanding of financial managers’ judgments. The procedures involve you evaluating 
a hypothetical case and responding to a series of questions. Your participation in this 
study is voluntary, and you can discontinue participation at any time. The study should 
take approximately 20-25 minutes. 
  
Your completion of this study constitutes informed consent to participate in the study. 
Your responses will remain strictly confidential and will be analyzed only after being 
combined with the responses of other participants. We will not access or link any 
individual identifying information to your response, and we will not collect IP addresses. 
If you have any additional comments or questions about the study, please contact any of 
the researchers indicated above. 
  
Research at the University of Scranton and Kennesaw State University that involves 
human participants is carried out under the oversight of Institutional Review Boards. If 
you have any questions about your rights as a research participant, or if you believe you 
have suffered an injury as a result of taking part in the research study, you may contact 
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Dr. Tabbi Miller-Scandle, IRB Administrator, Office of Research and Sponsored 
Programs, University of Scranton at (570) 941-5824 or tabbi.miller-
scandle@scranton.edu. Questions or problems regarding these activities should also be 
addressed to the Institutional Review Board, Kennesaw State University, 1000 Chastain 
Road, #0112, Kennesaw, GA 30144-5591, (678) 797-2268. 
  
We greatly appreciate your help in our efforts to understand financial manager 
judgments!  
I agree and give my consent to participate in this research project. I 
understand that participation is voluntary and that I may withdraw my consent at 
any time without penalty. 
I do not agree to participate and will be excluded from the remainder of the 
questions. 
 
Q2 
 
Instructions 
 
     1.  The pages that follow contain a hypothetical case for your consideration. The case 
includes summary  
          background information and some related questions for you to answer. 
 
     2.  Please assume that you are working as a financial manager for the Company 
when evaluating the 
          case and answering the questions. As the financial manager, you report to the 
Controller and are called 
          on to evaluate and recommend whether the Company should pursue project 
investment opportunities. 
          The success or failure of your investment recommendations is considered in your 
performance 
          evaluation and in determining your base pay adjustments and any incentive pay 
(e.g., bonuses). 
 
     3.  Please complete the materials in the order presented. There are no right or wrong 
answers, so please 
          answer the questions in a way that reflects your honest opinions and judgments. 
  
   
Thank you for your participation! 
 
Q3 
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Main Appliance Manufacturing, Inc. 
 
Company and Industry Background 
  
Main Appliance Manufacturing, Inc. (hereafter “the Company”) is a publicly-traded 
company, listed on the New York Stock Exchange, that manufactures and distributes a 
full line of household appliances to retailers throughout the United States. The Company 
operates in a competitive market affected by brand name, price, quality, and customer 
service. Customer demand has held steady in recent years, and the industry appears 
relatively robust. Company and industry sales and profitability have rebounded from the 
negative financial impact associated with the recent recession. 
  
Financial Performance  
  
The Company has experienced growth and margins over the years that are comparable to 
average companies in the industry. The following financial data have been derived from 
the Company’s financial statements. All amounts are in millions ($).    
  
  2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Net sales $1,012 $1,053 $1,055 $1,115 $1,136 
Net income 25 41 33 32 35 
Total assets 809 865 875 900 925 
  
Cash flows from operations have remained positive each year from 2009 to 2013. 
Profitability and trend level expectations from analysts, institutional investors, and 
creditors have been optimistic and reasonable. 
  
Capital Budgeting Policy: Required Rates of Return on Project Investments 
  
The Company’s Capital Budgeting Policy was approved by the board of directors’ 
investment committee and is applicable to all project investments. This policy established 
the Company’s current 6% minimum required return on project investments.      
  
Top Management    
  
Management has been led for the past 15 years by an experienced CEO. The Company’s 
CFO has been with the Company for 10 years and is a CPA with public accounting 
experience in one of the “Big Four” accounting firms. Management compensation is 
competitive with the industry, and incentive compensation (e.g., bonuses, stock options) 
is primarily based on operating results, financial position, and cash flow from operations. 
  
Board of Directors and Audit Committee  
  
The Company’s full board meets six times per year. Individual board committees (e.g., 
compensation, investment, audit, etc.) each set their own meeting schedule (often every 
quarter) and consist of members with specialized professional expertise appropriate to 
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their board committee duties. 
  
The Company’s audit committee is composed of four independent directors. The audit 
committee meets seven times per year (every other month plus an additional meeting 
with the external audit firm at year end). The Audit Committee Chair (ACC) has been a 
Company director and the ACC for the past eight years. The ACC and two other audit 
committee members are CPAs with public accounting experience. The fourth audit 
committee member has a finance degree and significant experience in the household 
appliance manufacturing industry. 
  
External Independent Auditor 
  
The current audit firm is one of the Big Four accounting firms. The firm has audited the 
Company for the past five years, with a clean opinion issued each year and no significant 
audit issues noted during this period. 
  
Internal Audit Department 
  
The Company has an internal audit department that conducts operational audits, performs 
internal control reviews, and assists the independent audit firm with the annual financial 
audit. 
 
Q4 – Risk Management Program Type Manipulation – Robust 
 
Risk Management Program 
  
The board of directors has directed management to establish an organization-wide risk 
management program (i.e., an enterprise risk management (ERM) program) primarily to 
ensure that the Company is effectively managing its risks. SEC regulations mandate 
public company board members to disclose their risk oversight role. In addition, New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) standards require that the Company’s audit committee 
discuss the firm’s risk management process and major financial risk exposures. The 
board has delegated responsibility for overseeing the ERM process implemented by 
management to the audit committee, but the full board monitors the top risk exposures 
identified by that process. The full board and the audit committee have assumed an active 
role in providing risk oversight and have placed a high priority on giving attention to risk 
management. The CEO and CFO share the board’s genuine enthusiasm for the 
Company’s ERM program, and they are willing to expend the required resources to 
ensure that it is properly implemented. 
  
Management has appointed a Chief Risk Officer (CRO), who was previously employed 
as a CRO for a manufacturing company in a similar industry as the Company, to assume 
risk oversight responsibilities. The CRO, who has specialized risk management 
experience, meets with the CEO and the CFO to discuss the Company’s risk exposures 
once each month. The audit committee also meets with the CRO each quarter to engage 
in substantive risk management discussions about key financial, operational, and 
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reputational risks. The CRO’s risk management recommendations are taken seriously and 
acted upon in a timely manner. 
  
The internal audit plan includes audits of the ERM program. The internal audit staff 
receives continuing professional education in risk management practices. 
  
Capital budgeting project investment decisions fall under the Company’s ERM program. 
 
Q5 – Risk Management Program Type Manipulation – Ceremonial 
 
Risk Management Program 
  
The board of directors has directed management to establish an organization-wide risk 
management program (i.e., an enterprise risk management (ERM) program) primarily to 
demonstrate that the Company is in compliance with regulations. SEC regulations 
mandate public company board members to disclose their risk oversight role. In addition, 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) standards require that the Company’s audit 
committee discuss the firm’s risk management process and major financial risk 
exposures. The board has delegated responsibility for overseeing the ERM process 
implemented by management to the audit committee, but the full board is supposed to be 
informed of the top risk exposures identified by that process. The full board and the audit 
committee have not assumed an active role in providing risk oversight and have not 
placed a high priority on giving attention to risk management. The CEO and CFO 
understand the board’s intent of demonstrating compliance with regulations, and they do 
not support expending resources for an ERM program. 
  
Management has appointed the Controller of the Company to assume risk oversight 
responsibilities. The Controller, who lacks specialized risk management experience, 
occasionally mentions the Company’s risk exposures to the CEO and the CFO as part of 
other meetings that focus on financial reporting issues. The Controller ensures that the 
matter of “risk oversight” appears in the board minutes once each calendar year by 
including this topic on the agenda of the annual meeting with the audit committee related 
to internal controls. The Controller does not make any risk management 
recommendations. 
  
The internal audit plan does not include audits of the ERM program. The internal audit 
staff receives continuing professional education in internal controls. 
  
Capital budgeting project investment decisions fall under the Company’s ERM program. 
 
Q6 – Financial Risk Level Manipulation – High (Large Investment Size) 
 
Possible New Product Introduction 
The Company’s top management is presently considering a capital budgeting decision for 
a new product introduction that requires a large financial investment (relative to other 
project investments). The Company’s Capital Budgeting Policy established a 6% 
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minimum required return on project investments. Missing the minimum required return 
on relatively large investments significantly impacts the Company’s ability to meet its 
overall profitability goals. 
   
The Company’s top management must decide whether to introduce a new household 
appliance. Manufacturing of the new product will require a large financial investment 
(relative to other project investments) in production equipment modifications and in the 
purchase of raw materials. The new appliance is a “swift-cook” oven that uses halogen 
bulbs to enable reduced cooking times, while retaining conventional oven cooking flavor. 
The swift-cook oven is not yet widely accepted in the market, and the retail selling price 
would need to be slightly higher than established conventional oven prices in order to 
achieve normal gross margins. Manufacturing of the swift-cook ovens would be funded 
through internal funds. Consultation with the Company’s marketing personnel reveals 
mixed views about whether the new product introduction will meet the Company’s 6% 
minimum required rate of return on project investments.  
 
Q7 – Financial Risk Level Manipulation – Low (Small Investment Size) 
 
Possible New Product Introduction 
The Company’s top management is presently considering a capital budgeting decision for 
a new product introduction that requires a small financial investment (relative to other 
project investments). The Company’s Capital Budgeting Policy established a 6% 
minimum required return on project investments. Missing the minimum required return 
on relatively small investments modestly impacts the Company’s ability to meet its 
overall profitability goals. 
   
The Company’s top management must decide whether to introduce a new household 
appliance. Manufacturing of the new product will require a small financial investment 
(relative to other project investments) in production equipment modifications and in the 
purchase of raw materials. The new appliance is a “swift-cook” oven that uses halogen 
bulbs to enable reduced cooking times, while retaining conventional oven cooking flavor. 
The swift-cook oven is not yet widely accepted in the market, and the retail selling price 
would need to be slightly higher than established conventional oven prices in order to 
achieve normal gross margins. Manufacturing of the swift-cook ovens would be funded 
through internal funds. Consultation with the Company’s marketing personnel reveals 
mixed views about whether the new product introduction will meet the Company’s 6% 
minimum required rate of return on project investments.  
 
Q8 
As a financial manager charged with evaluating and making recommendations about 
whether the Company should pursue project investment opportunities, please slide the bar 
below to indicate the likelihood you would recommend that the Company make the 
financial investment to manufacture the new swift-cook oven (0 = Not at all likely, 50 = 
Moderately likely, 100 = Very likely). 
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Sliding scale 0 to 100 
Q9 
 
Please describe the factors you considered in your response to the question above. 
 
Q10 
 
Please slide the bar below to indicate how much time you would take to develop a 
recommendation for this project investment relative to a typical project investment 
recommendation (0 = Much less time, 50 = About average time, 100 = Much more time). 
 
Sliding scale 0 to 100 
 
Q11 
 
Please describe the factors you considered in your response to the question above. 
 
Q12 
 
Please slide the bar below to indicate the extent that you would consult with others to 
develop a recommendation for this project investment relative to a typical project 
investment recommendation (0 = Much less consultation, 50 = About average 
consultation, 100 = Much more consultation). 
 
Q13 
 
Please describe the factors you considered in your response to the question above. 
 
Q14 
 
Please indicate the individual(s) with whom you would consult. 
 
Q15 through Q19 
 
Please slide the bar below to indicate the extent that the following factors affected your 
recommendation about whether the Company should make the project investment (0 = 
Minimal effect, 50 = Moderate effect, 100 = Significant effect). 
 
Board of directors’ attitude toward risk management 
 
Sliding scale o to 100 
 
Top managements’ attitude toward risk management 
 
Sliding scale 0 to 100 
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The employee appointed in charge of risk oversight 
 
Sliding scale 0 to 100 
 
Internal audit's level of evaluation of the Company’s ERM program 
 
Sliding scale 0 to 100 
 
Relative size of the project investment 
 
Sliding scale 0 to 100      
 
Q20 and Q21 
 
Please slide the bar below to indicate to what extent you feel accountable to the below 
parties for the risk associated with your recommendation about whether the Company 
should make the project investment (0 = Minimal accountability, 50 = Moderate 
accountability, 100 = Significant accountability). 
 
Board of directors 
 
Sliding scale 0 to 100 
 
Top management 
 
Sliding scale 0 to 100 
 
Q22 and Q23 
 
Please slide the bar below to indicate the extent that you believe the below parties are risk 
averse (0 = Minimal risk aversion, 50 = Moderate risk aversion, 100 = Significant risk 
aversion). 
 
Board of directors 
 
Sliding scale 0 to 100 
 
Top management 
 
Sliding scale 0 to 100 
 
Q24 
 
Please slide the bar below to indicate the level of risk for this project investment (0 = 
Low risk, 50 = Moderate risk, 100 = High risk). 
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Sliding scale 0 to 100 
 
Q25 and Q26 
 
Please slide the bar below to indicate the extent that you believe the below parties support 
the Company's ERM program (0 = Minimal support, 50 = Moderate support, 100 = 
Significant support). 
 
Board of directors 
 
Sliding scale 0 to 100 
 
Top management  
 
Sliding scale 0 to 100 
 
Q27 
 
Please answer the following questions without referring back to the prior screens.  
 
Q28 – Manipulation Check – Risk Management Program Type 
 
Please indicate the Company’s primary motivation for establishing its ERM program 
based on the facts of the case: 
To ensure that the Company is effectively managing its risks  
To demonstrate that the Company is in compliance with SEC and NYSE 
regulations  
Q29 – Manipulation Check – Financial Risk Level 
 
Please indicate the relative size of the project investment in this case: 
Large  
Small 
Q30 
 
Please slide the bar below to indicate how realistic this case was (0 = Very unrealistic, 50 
= Moderately realistic, 100 = Very realistic). 
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Sliding scale 0 to 100 
 
Q31 
 
Please slide the bar below to indicate how understandable this case was (0 = Very 
difficult to understand, 50 = Moderately understandable, 100 = Very understandable). 
 
Sliding scale 0 to 100 
 
Please indicate whether you have had any experience with a risk management program in 
your career. 
No  
Yes 
Q32 
 
The focus of ERM programs varies among organizations. Some organizations merely 
focus on compliance with regulations (i.e., a compliance-based ERM focus), while other 
organizations also focus on effectively managing risks (i.e., a risk-based ERM focus). 
Please slide the bar below to indicate the primary focus of the risk management 
program(s) you have experienced in your career (0 = Primarily compliance-based ERM 
focus, 100 = Primarily risk-based ERM focus). 
 
Sliding scale 0 to 100 
 
Q33 
 
Please indicate whether you have had any professional experience in making project 
investment recommendations or decisions in your career. 
No  
Yes 
Q34 
 
Please slide the bar below to indicate the extent of your professional experience in 
making project investment recommendations or decisions (0 = Minimal experience, 50 = 
Moderate experience, 100 = Significant experience). 
 
Sliding scale 0 to 100 
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Q35 
 
Please slide the bar below to describe the degree that your overall professional experience 
in making project investment recommendations or decisions has been favorable (0 = Very 
unfavorable, 100 = Very favorable). 
 
Sliding scale from 0 to 100 
 
Q36 through Q47 
 
The following set of questions relates to general risk-taking situations and is not related 
to the specific case study.  
 
Please could you tell us if any of the following have ever applied to you, now or in your 
adult past? 
 
All using 5-point scale (1 = Never, 2 = Rarely, 3 = Occasionally, 4 = Often, 5 = Very 
Often) 
 
Recreational risks (e.g., rock-climbing, scuba diving) 
 
Health risks (e.g., smoking, poor diet, high alcohol consumption) 
 
Career risks (e.g., quitting a job without another to go to) 
 
Financial risks (e.g., gambling, risky investments) 
 
Safety risks (e.g., fast driving, cycling without a helmet) 
 
Social risks (e.g., standing for election, publicly challenging a rule or decision) 
 
The questions that follow are for classification purposes only. No effort will be made to 
identify you based on the information you provide. 
 
Q48 
 
Please indicate your gender. 
Male  
Female 
Q49 
 
Please indicate your total years of professional business experience. 
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Less than 5 years  
5 to 10 years  
11 to 15 years  
16 to 20 years  
21 to 25 years  
Over 25 years 
Q50 
 
Please indicate your current title. 
CFO  
Financial Manager  
Controller  
Assistant Controller  
Staff Accountant  
External Auditor  
Internal Auditor  
Other 
Q51 
Please indicate below any professional certifications that you hold (check all that apply). 
CMA  
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CPA  
CFA  
Other (please indicate below)  
I do not hold any professional certifications  
 
Q52 
 
Please indicate your highest degree. 
High School/Associate's Degree  
Bachelor's Degree  
Master's Degree  
Law Degree  
Doctoral Degree (e.g., Ph.D, DBA) 
Q53 
 
Please indicate the segment in which you currently work. 
Public Company  
Private For-Profit Company  
Not-For-Profit  
Government  
Public Accounting  
Other 
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Q54 
 
Please indicate the approximate annual revenue of your employer. 
Less than $10 million  
$10 million to $100 million  
$101 million to $500 million  
$501 million to $1 billion  
More than $1 billion 
Q55 
 
Please share any additional thoughts you may have about this case. 
 
Q56 
 
Your responses have been recorded and will remain strictly confidential. If you would 
like to be entered in the $100 American Express gift certificate drawing and/or receive a 
summary report of the aggregate survey responses, please check the appropriate box(es) 
below and provide an e-mail address where we may contact you for these purposes. 
(Your e-mail address will only be used for these purposes and will be disassociated from 
your survey responses.) 
Enter me in the $100 American Express gift certificate drawing (please 
provide email address below).  
Please send me a summary report of the survey responses (please provide 
email address below).  
 
Q57 
 
Please provide email address below if you indicated that you wanted to enter in the 
drawing and/or be provided a summary report. 
 
We thank you for your time spent taking this survey.  
Your response has been recorded.  
